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Article
Obama’s Conversion on Same-Sex Marriage: The 
Social Foundations of Individual Rights
ROBERT L. TSAI
This article explores how presidents who wish to seize a leadership role over 
the development of rights must tend to the social foundations of those rights. 
Broad cultural changes alone do not guarantee success, nor do they dictate the 
substance of constitutional ideas. Rather, presidential aides must actively re-
characterize the social conditions in which rights are made, disseminated, and 
enforced. An administration must articulate a strategically plausible theory of a 
particular right, ensure there is cultural and institutional support for that right, 
and work to minimize blowback. Executive branch officials must seek to transform 
and popularize legal concepts while working within a broader professional and 
political culture that respects the role of other branches of government, including 
the prerogative of the courts to interpret the laws. A useful case study concerns the 
Obama administration’s shift in position on the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) and its subsequent articulation of a theory of equality that encompasses 
same-sex marriage. This episode should be understood, in part, as an act of 
presidential leadership over individual rights, though presidentially-instigated 
rights differ from judicially-derived ones. Recognizing this model of leadership 
doesn’t require embracing executive supremacy, but it does suggest we ought to 
emphasize institutional dynamics over party politics or social movements in 
explanations of constitutional change.
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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to the protection of individual rights, one’s thoughts 
can be easily clouded by the great myth of judicial statesmanship. We have 
all been regaled with accounts of landmark rulings like Brown v. Board of 
Education1 and Roe v. Wade,2 which inspire an abiding hope in lawsuits as 
the best route to political justice. But this is an unrealistic ideal because 
judges rarely, if ever, step out beyond the realm of a political or cultural 
consensus to defend minority rights, real or imagined.3 Even if it were 
possible to do so, it would not be normatively desirable for judges to stray 
too far from what can be sustained socially and politically.  
There are other reasons not to put one’s faith entirely in the legal 
system. Judicial leadership over rights simply is not borne out in historical 
practice. Through a combination of training and practice, judges tend to be 
conservative by disposition; they are also constrained by elaborate systems 
of procedural review and a professional culture that values workmanlike 
resolution of specific cases rather than revolutionary action. Few judges 
enjoy being reversed by higher-ranking judges, declared mistaken in their 
legal methods, or branded traitors to the people when they issue rulings 
that call into question voters’ moral choices. Judges promise finality but 
                                                                                                                         
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. Parts of this paper were 
presented at the Constitutional Law Colloquium at Loyola University Law School in Chicago, the 
Constitutional Law Roundtable at the University of Maryland, and workshops at American 
University’s Washington College of Law. My thanks to Erwin Chemerinsky, Jim Fleming, Mark 
Graber, Linda McClain, and Sachin Pandya. I am also grateful to the AU and University of Georgia 
law students who have taken my seminar on Presidential Leadership, Legal Transformation, and 
Individual Rights, as well as those who have taken my course on Jurisprudence. My Dean’s Fellows 
Stephanie Leacock, Cody Meixner, Stephanie MacInnes, Haaris Pasha, James Purce, and Catherine 
Warren rendered valuable research assistance. Generous support came from Dean Claudio Grossman, 
Dean Camille Nelson, and Associate Dean for Scholarship Jenny Roberts. Michael Rondon and the 
excellent staff of the Connecticut Law Review made the editorial process a pleasure.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 I join the chorus of political scientists and legal theorists who have found that constitutional law 
rarely departs too far from national sentiment. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW
TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); MARK A.
GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006); GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-
Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
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can deliver, at best, the terms for future debate. Even when judges lay 
down grand constitutional principles, they are inevitably subject to 
narrowing and piece-meal reversal by subsequent decision makers, as well 
as creative forms of resistance by political actors. Litigation can be critical 
at various stages of transformative change, but what society obtains from 
the judicial process is largely rhetorical in nature: public rationales, ways 
of talking about rights, and a few choice phrases that can penetrate the 
news cycle and capture the stakes for ordinary citizens.
This is all valuable cultural material from which we can begin a
national conversation or sustain legal transformations already under way,
but a judicial decision alone should not be mistaken for a final resolution 
or the equivalent of democratic justice.4 A theory of rights based on the 
false hope of judicial salvation ends in failure before it even begins. The 
point is not that judicial participation in the development of rights is 
unimportant—of course it is—but rather that judicial craftsmanship is 
grossly incomplete as an account for how constitutional rights are actually 
made or enforced and whether they will stand the test of time.
In truth, lasting legal change ultimately can be measured by the degree 
to which political actors are successful in securing others’ compliance with
judicial rulings (either through acquiescence, socialization, or 
institutionalization)5 and in creating the overall perception that 
constitutional norms have become sufficiently settled that they are 
obligatory (the way actors within the legal system talk about the law also is 
a reminder that the “settlement” of law is a claim about social perception 
of the law). We learn more about what constitutional rights actually mean 
from how non-judicial institutions and political actors deal with ideas of 
law and justice in their social milieu than from a glorious ruling itself 
within the confines of existing jurisprudence. How elected officials choose 
to respond to important judicial rulings, or what they do in stepping into 
                                                                                                                         
4 See generally ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT 
CULTURE (2008) (discussing the different ways in which social support for constitutional principles can 
be measured and cutting into finer detail prevailing jurisprudential accounts of why citizens might obey 
the law). Compare Leslie Greene, Law and Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514–47 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2001) 
(discussing the “obligatory” nature of law), with John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair 
Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM 3–18 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964) (treating obedience to the 
law as a matter of fairness because citizens enjoy the benefits of citizenship).
5 Acquiescence involves bowing to another’s interpretation whether in recognition of a superior 
power or out of convenience, even if they do not publicly endorse its rationale. Socialization entails 
self-conscious internalization of legal norms, which can occur through education, media, training, and 
similar processes. Institutionalization takes the cultural theory of law to the next step of both 
intentionality and permanence, where the building or remaking of organizations facilitates the 
perpetuation of preferred legal views. Scholars in recent years have paid greater attention to processes 
of socialization. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Ryan Goodman & 
Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE
L.J. 621, 628 (2004).
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the breach when judges refuse to enter a field of action or render 
parsimonious readings of the Constitution, determines the actual scope of 
American freedoms—often, decisively so.
For all of these reasons, we must pay careful attention to what I call 
“the social plausibility” of rights: whether a certain interpretation of the 
law not only seems to be a thoughtful solution based on acceptable modes 
of argumentation, but also is likely to be publicly accepted by ordinary 
citizens, public officials, and judges. But where some scholars try to match 
judicial outcomes to majoritarian views in rather crude fashion,6 I believe it 
is more descriptively accurate to say that, at any given moment in time, 
there exists a range of socially plausible interpretations of legal text.  That 
way, we don’t assert the existence of consensus as another way of 
imposing hegemony by falsely suggesting, even unwittingly, that for every 
constitutional question there can be only one correct answer.  
For every constitutional question there will be a range of socially 
plausible interpretations. Some readings of text will be better than others, 
while some interpretations will seem entirely out of bounds in the sense 
that they are simply not culturally sustainable.7 A constitutional 
understanding that seems outrageous is vulnerable precisely because of the 
ease with which one might mobilize against it as a usurpation of authority, 
an apparent act of will rather than a faithful reading of law.
There is yet another point that follows from these premises: because 
constitutional interpretation is constantly being done by a variety of jurists, 
agencies, institutions, and political actors, different theories of the 
Constitution abound and jockey for legitimacy and dominance. This aspect 
of the constitutional process entails an ideological conflict waged across
historical time, through a variety of bureaucracies and political resources. 
Constitutional conflict is not the exact same thing as electoral conflict or 
philosophical disagreement, and practitioners may engage in it according 
to established customs, but it nevertheless uses the same basic apparatus to 
make legal achievements and punish those who violate legal norms.
To illustrate these insights, this essay explores what it means for a 
president to lead on questions of individual rights—that is, to depart from 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and to insist that he has the better view 
                                                                                                                         
6 Examples of the correct insight—that courts tend to follow public sentiment rather than lead it—
coupled with overly brute pictures of the broader process of constitutional meaning-making include 
Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369 
(1992) and Dahl, supra note 3, at 279–81.
7 Jack Balkin has colloquially referred to arguments that are not socially plausible at the moment 
of interpretation as “off the wall.” Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 291, 309 (2007). The real question is what institutions, practices, rules, and other things 
constrain the field of social plausibility. 
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of the Constitution.8 When a president decides to act in this way, he is 
setting up certain kinds of social forces against other kinds of cultural 
dynamics, while trying to capitalize on favorable social trends and 
institutional practices. All of this is unavoidable, though the degree of 
conflict can be made more or less visible, and the transformation of 
individual rights can be accomplished either to foster societal acceptance 
or inflame resistance. 
There have been many intriguing examples of executive-led 
development of constitutional rights, from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s call for 
freedom of speech and religion “everywhere in the world” to Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s championing of racial equality.9 Exploring when and how 
presidential actors advance their own conceptions of individual rights 
reveals the recurring obstacles to presidential leadership over such matters 
as well as the social conditions that must exist—or be fostered—before 
decisive action can be taken to alter status-quo theories of the Constitution.   
Presidents do more than dutifully “enforce” judicially created rights;
they also make rights on an everyday basis by manipulating the social 
foundations for individual rights. Presidents—or more accurately, 
executive branch officials acting in the name of a president—theorize 
about rights, implement what they believe to be the proper conception of 
legal concepts, and in so doing, effectively create rights that differ from 
juridically conceived ones. As Keith Whittington puts it, “The Constitution 
is foundational in American politics, not only in the sense that it 
establishes the boundaries of legal action but also in the sense that it 
authorizes, invites, and structures political activity.”10 Political and social 
activity ultimately determines the true scope of rights.  
Rights discourse can be shaped through presidential will because 
“visions of political leadership lead [a president] to push the boundaries of 
that tradition.”11 That presidents occasionally seize a leadership position 
with regard to individual rights and that they must respond to claims of 
inequity in ways that differ from that of judges does not render their 
                                                                                                                         
8 Since the goal of this project is to arrive at insights about how presidents of any political 
persuasion can lead on rights, the model is not committed to any baseline conception of rights. Thus, if 
a president seeks to “expand” or “contract” rights, it is only in relationship to the courts and not to what 
I consider to be a conceptual floor. Though important, whether it is a good idea to have a robust right in 
any particular instance is not the central concern of this essay. Thus, when I speak of what presidents 
are doing to rights, I am speaking only in relative terms rather than absolute ones.
9 For some recent scholarship on some of these episodes, see generally Joseph Landau, 
Presidential Constitutionalism and Civil Rights, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1719 (2014); Joseph 
Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Federal Law, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 619 (2012); Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise of Presidential Leadership, 86 
WASH. U.L. REV. 363 (2008).
10 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 19 (2007).
11 Id.
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decisions less than constitutional law, but rather a different kind of 
constitutional law.
Political actors do, and often should, push beyond juridic conceptions 
of individual rights precisely because judges tend to be conservatizing 
figures rather than visionaries. Presidents, like judges, are oath-bound to 
defend the Constitution. But unlike judges, presidents are elected to 
provide charismatic, and often visionary, leadership. Many presidents lay 
claim to a form of popular sovereignty that is urgent and backed by 
victories at the ballot box. This is true whether voters feel it is time for an 
eloquent, multi-racial leader like Barack Obama to burnish America’s 
reputation for freedom and equality or instead that it is time for a brash,
nationalist figure like Donald Trump to disrupt the patterns of elitism and 
globalism. 
Bringing the Constitution closer in line with the sentiments of the 
people might require harnessing divergent, and even alternative,
interpretations of the Constitution to erode entrenched understandings 
within the courts. But it’s not enough to want to change a legal regime.
How the gears of constitutional change are engaged matter. To be most 
effective, presidents must pursue projects of legal transformation in ways 
that are attentive to how their interpretive resistance is perceived. Because 
of a widely-shared belief in both separation of powers and judicial 
review,12 those who act in the name of the president must be viewed as 
acting mostly within their proper spheres of influence, even as they seek to 
alter the social conditions in which courts decide cases—all without 
appearing to usurp the judiciary’s prerogative to “say what the law is.”13
Presidents are elected in part based on their agendas, which encompass 
not only public policies but also popular perceptions of how key rights, 
powers, and institutions might be reshaped. Through intense media 
scrutiny and the major party system, candidates are pushed to be 
transparent about their agendas and to sharpen the ideological consistency 
of their positions. Elections authorize presidents to be empathic towards
others and to respond to the needs of citizens, on a broader scale than 
judges can or should. If there is anything we have learned from the field of 
presidential studies, it is that every president cares enormously about his 
historical reputation. All of these characteristics of the institution can make 
the presidency an effective guardian of liberty and equality when decisive 
action is warranted and there exists political will to do so. The modern 
president can challenge the laws and practices of states and local 
governments when liberties are threatened, and can find ways to resist 
                                                                                                                         
12 Keith Whittington’s work shows how elected officials have, for their own reasons, helped to 
prop up the perception of judicial supremacy, even if they do not always believe in it in a deep 
philosophical way. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 26–27.
13 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1, 177 (1803).
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legislative encroachments on individual rights at the national level. To the 
extent new rules, institutions, and theories of law are formulated and 
become socially grounded, they can also restrain successive 
administrations.
During the Obama administration, we witnessed ingenious, and at 
times highly effective, instances of presidential leadership over individual 
rights. Take the topic of equal rights for gays and lesbians. President 
Obama’s turnabout on gay marriage has received perhaps the most 
attention. But in fact, in the years leading up to this event, the 
administration had advanced a broad conception of equal protection of the 
law across an entire spectrum of issues involving sexual orientation: the 
federal workplace, military, tax policy, federal benefits, education, and 
even foreign policy. And it did so in ways that went well beyond how the 
U.S. Supreme Court and Congress understood the principle of 
egalitarianism.
In this essay, I focus on the actions by the Obama administration on 
gay marriage, which ultimately helped lead to the Court’s rulings in United 
States v. Windsor14 and Obergefell v. Hodges,15 and theorize the episode as 
the exercise of presidential leadership. My approach does not supplant 
accounts that focus on the role of popular opinion,16 social movements,17
litigation strategy,18 or jurisprudence.19 Instead, I situate those elements 
within an institutional model through which different players seek to 
dictate the development of constitutional rights by turning social changes 
into persuasive legal arguments. 
This article begins in Part I by teasing out some of the unique features 
of gay rights as a case study for presidential leadership. It does so by 
examining in detail the Obama administration’s change of legal position on 
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). I explain how the 
administration decided to repudiate DOMA, how it justified its decision, 
                                                                                                                         
14 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
15 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
16 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality,
127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 12735 (2013) (contending that changes in popular opinion made the Windsor
decision possible).  
17 See, e.g., Zachary A. Kramer, Before and After Obergefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 797, 801 (2016) 
(“[T]here is no question that the gay rights movement has accomplished an incredible thing.”).
18 See, e.g., Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 43
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 246 (2015) (arguing that Obergefell resulted from innovative litigation 
strategies).
19 See, e.g., Thomas A. Bird, Note, Challenging the Levels of Generality Problem: How 
Obergefell v. Hodges Created a New Methodology for Defining Rights, 19 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 579, 599 (2016) (emphasizing Justice Kennedy’s choice to define a right at a relatively “higher 
level of generality” than usual); Jack B. Harrison, At Long Last Marriage, 24 AM. U.J. GENDER & SOC.
POL’Y & L. 1, 52 (2015) (focusing on Justice Kennedy’s framing of the constitutional issue “within the 
context of the evolution of the understanding of marriage”).
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and how the administration’s theory of equality differed from judicial 
theories of equality. In Part II, I explore the dynamics of jurisprudential 
bootstrapping, an especially powerful tactic for a president, by which an 
administration leverages achievements on rights in one domain to make 
changes in another domain. More broadly, I venture into some arguments 
as to why executive-based theories of liberty can be superior to judicial 
interpretations. Finally, in Part III, I defend presidential leadership as a 
model of constitutional lawmaking from the objection that it requires the 
subordination of the judiciary. I conclude by distinguishing this model 
from a leading account of constitutional change offered by Professors 
Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin called “partisan entrenchment” and 
from explanations that emphasize the role of social movements.20
I. PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP ON GAY MARRIAGE
My approach differs from the leading historical account of legal 
change: the gestalt approach. The gestalt model explains major legal 
changes as the byproduct of sweeping social and historical phenomena.21
By contrast, the leadership model stresses the role of autonomous decisions 
by a president and his allies to either embrace or repudiate cultural 
dynamics. These actions, taken with particular institutional and political 
considerations in mind, help drive constitutional change or cement a 
transformation already underway.
Professor Michael Klarman of Harvard Law School exemplifies the 
gestalt approach to the stunning gay marriage rulings. Klarman argues that 
the outcomes can be explained by “enormous changes in the surrounding 
social and political contexts.”22 For Klarman, “the critical development has 
been the coming-out phenomenon, which over a period of decades has led 
to extraordinary changes in attitudes and practices regarding sexual 
orientation.”23 While it is true that broad societal changes made it 
conceivable that the Equal Protection Clause might be read to encompass 
gay relationships, such an explanatory model tells us very little about the 
                                                                                                                         
20 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan 
Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 491 (2006).
21 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 43 (2013) (using a gestalt model to “organize[] our perception of cases, rules, and 
doctrinal theories” regarding the development of constitutional law).
22 Klarman, supra note 16, at 132. One area of overlap between a descriptive model of 
constitutional change that emphasizes broad cultural and ethical factors, such as Klarman’s, and the 
model of presidential leadership I articulate here is a de-emphasis of the constraining capacity of legal 
doctrines. For Klarman, the substantive law in landmark cases seems to be shaped by “strong intuitions 
of fairness and right” rather than workmanlike reasoning from existing precedent and well-established 
rules. Id. at 142. Moreover, he suggests that something akin to the judgment of history is a more likely 
constraining factor than a raw evaluation of current public opinion. Id. at 160.
23 Id. at 132.
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timing, pace, or strategies involved. Indeed, gestalt models can feel oddly
deterministic, as if changes in society alone are sufficient to ensure the 
transformation of constitutional law. Uncertain, too, in many such accounts 
is how constitutional actors ought to treat shifting social terrain as a 
normative matter when they interpret the Constitution.   
Presidential action helps fill this gap in our picture of constitutional 
lawmaking by illuminating the role of a critical player in the development 
of individual rights on a national scale. It enriches our picture of how 
constitutional change happens and makes the normative case that a 
president’s portrayal of social change ought to be accorded some degree of 
deference. As Obama reached the end of his first term, executive branch 
officials advanced the cause of sexual orientation equality on a number of 
fronts. Although the President himself had not yet endorsed gay marriage 
as a substantive right, on February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder 
informed Congress that the administration would no longer defend DOMA 
in court.24
That strategic choice not only reflected changed conditions within the 
administration on gay marriage, but also removed a major obstacle to more 
aggressive executive branch efforts to articulate a broadened theory of 
equality before the courts. Eventually, Department of Justice (DOJ)
lawyers would do just that, nudging the courts to catch up with the 
administration’s more popular conception of equality and signaling to the 
judiciary that pro-gay rights rulings would be supported by the executive 
branch.  
As this incident will demonstrate, a coherent theory of individual rights 
must not be held captive by a false, court-centered sense of justice or 
obscured by a formalistic understanding of constitutional interpretation. 
Rather, a plausible account of executive branch constitutional lawmaking 
must be attuned to the social foundations of rights in action. The most 
fruitful line of inquiry into how rights are developed and enforced by 
presidents, then, lies in the muck of party politics and confusion of 
everyday institutional behavior. Here, I wish to underscore a crucial 
methodological point: To uncover the ways in which political leaders make 
and unmake individual rights, we have to soften the emphasis on formal 
power and employ methods that favor descriptive accuracy. Once we get 
this picture right, we must also approach normative questions of 
constitutional law simultaneously from a social, strategic, and holistic
perspective.25
                                                                                                                         
24 Letter from Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of Pub. Aff., to Congress on Litigation 
Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-
general-congress-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act.
25 George Edwards, who counts himself among the skeptics of the power of presidential 
persuasion, nevertheless believes that astute presidents can exploit favorable circumstances to advance 
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A few rules of thumb seem in order. First, although one human being 
is elected president, in actuality, law is made by an administration 
comprised of many individuals, agencies, and organizations, each with 
their own motivations, spheres of influence, strategies, and experiences. 
The environment in which executive decisions are made can be so 
paralyzing that a leading scholar in the field once famously quipped that 
the president is really a glorified “clerk.”26 All the same, these confining 
social conditions can be transcended to make dramatic progress on a matter 
of individual rights—whether it is to expand, reconceive, or limit them. 
The conditions for political action on a question of individual rights shift 
depending on the interaction of these relationships and organizations 
against a broader economic and cultural backdrop. Actions to move the 
needle on rights taken in one historical moment might not be socially 
plausible at another moment in time.
Second, when a president acts in the name of liberty or equality, his 
theory of rights is shaped according to significant strategic considerations.
Considerations of professional reputation and public prestige influence a
president’s behavior in ways that differ from similar constraints on judging
or congressional law making. If favorable social conditions create 
opportunities for presidential action, then we must also learn more about 
the range of forms which executive action might take when rights are at 
stake. Tactically, political actors working in the name of a president decide 
when and where to advance an individual rights agenda.27 Within the 
modern administrative state, these figures determine which levers of power 
to press, what resources to marshal for these purposes, how hard to fight 
for a cause, and how broadly to define a constitutional right or liberty.  
Collectively, these tactical choices influence the odds that 
constitutional change is enduring rather than fleeting. A targeted 
intervention by officials might be most tempting on a highly controversial 
issue and yield incremental gains; while on another occasion, flooding the 
zone by using multiple resources at a president’s disposal over a range of 
related issues touching on rights might be called for. The latter approach 
best describes the Obama administration’s approach to the rights of sexual 
minorities: building social and institutional grounding for an expanded 
                                                                                                                         
an agenda. GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, THE STRATEGIC PRESIDENT: PERSUASION AND OPPORTUNITY IN 
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 1–9, 188–89 (2009).
26 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS ix (1991).
27 Whereas Neustadt emphasized a president’s power to persuade others and to reach political 
bargains, other scholars have explored a broader range of presidential tactics. See generally JOHN P.
BURKE, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THEORIES AND DILEMMAS 56–58 (2016) (adding ten other sources of 
presidential power, including “coercive power” and “agenda power”). Those who follow Stephen 
Skowronek stress historical trends as constraints on what presidents can and cannot do, even if they are 
committed to a decisive course of action. See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL 
LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME: REPRISE AND REAPPRAISAL (2011).
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theory of equality in carefully selected areas, and then leveraging those 
successes to make gains in other areas.  
It is true that strategic considerations affect all judicial rulings, but the 
ones facing presidential actors differ in crucial ways. Broader societal 
values and political realignments can reshape the decisions of judges, but 
they do so far more slowly and indirectly than they do for presidential 
decisions. The politics affecting judicial outcomes are more bureaucratic in 
nature and diffused throughout multi-member tribunals like a court of 
appeals or the Supreme Court. By contrast, presidents and their aides can 
respond more nimbly and aggressively to changes in cultural sentiment and
political trends. 
A president committed to popular defense of rights can wield tools that 
are both more efficient and effective than those available to judges. The 
judiciary’s primary advantage on rights involves the institutional respect 
given to the legal system charged with interpreting the laws, as well as the 
procedural mechanisms that can be manipulated in defense of rights. 
Executive branch officials have far more tools at their disposal for creating, 
and sustaining, popular conceptions of rights.
Third, an individual right can look very different as its contours are
shaped by the unique strategic and social realities facing a president.28 The 
differences between politically-created and juridically-ordered rights are 
important to appreciate, since the true measure of any particular right lies 
in some uncomfortable amalgamation of the two. The complex nature of 
our rights regime builds inefficiencies into the legal order precisely to deter 
the violation of individual liberties. But this design complexity, which 
encourages political leaders to theorize about rights, does not render 
political rights incoherent or less tangible than juridical creations. To the 
contrary, there are good reasons to expect that in a number of situations, 
politically entrenched rights may be more durable than judicially 
articulated rights. After all, a president will be more invested in the rights 
he has played a role in creating.
                                                                                                                         
28 For now, I shall resist getting embroiled in terminological debates with other scholars over 
whether to call presidential enforcement of the Constitution something else. Keith Whittington, for 
instance, has called presidential action “construction” of the Constitution to distinguish it from 
“interpretation,” something he believes is reserved for judges alone. See generally KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
(1999). Other theorists have described parts of judicial review to entail “construction.” For ease of 
understanding in this essay, I will refer to “presidential action,” “initiative,” or “leadership” to broadly 
encapsulate how presidential actors enforce their understandings of the Constitution. These actors have 
their own “interpretations” of the Constitution or “conceptions” of rights. 
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A. Rights in Action: Party, Reelection, History
Gay rights present an instructive area for case studies because it is 
difficult to call progress on this front the product of pure majoritarianism. 
To begin, we should dispense with the claim that such dramatic progress 
on gay rights was inevitable, because this perspective denies the agency of 
constitutional actors and tells us nothing in particular about the pace or 
means of legal change. Instead, constitutional transformation on gay rights 
occurred because some softening of cultural mores created opportunities to 
be exploited by legal actors within a complex political system. These 
figures made key strategic decisions to force a deep rethinking of legal 
concepts. 
Despite a greater societal tolerance of sexual difference, there remain 
religious traditions and influential cultural institutions that look upon 
homosexuality as sinful and corrosive of traditional sex roles. Attitudes 
toward homosexuality have shifted far more rapidly within the Democratic 
Party—leading to greater pressure for legal changes that benefit sexual 
minorities when Democrats occupy the White House. But those same 
pressures do not exist to the same degree in the Republican Party, whose 
grassroots activists tend to hold more socially conservative views about 
marriage, sexual identity, and sexual behavior.
The fact that political power is diffused among different institutions in 
the American system is another reason why majoritarian sentiment can be 
so easily obstructed even when it exists. A president whose party does not 
share the majority of voters’ view of human sexuality or their sense of 
egalitarianism can frustrate the development of the law so that it does not 
reflect popular attitudes. Similarly, a dissenting party’s control of one 
house of Congress can impede the passage of anti-lynching legislation or 
the addition of sexual orientation to the nation’s civil rights laws. What is 
true about public policy is even truer about constitutional law’s 
connections to popular sentiment: whether to close that distance, and how 
quickly to do so, remains a matter of strategic action rather than 
predestination or the mystery of cultural change alone. 
Presidential leadership on gay rights seemed to be driven not only by a 
moral imperative shared keenly by Democratic Party members and more 
weakly by average citizens, but also by an overriding desire on the part of 
President Obama to be perceived as a strong national leader. No one was 
ever deemed a great president by being merely a faithful “party man.”
Stepping forward to defend politically vulnerable minorities can produce 
positive reputational effects for a president if presented in the right way.29
                                                                                                                         
29 As James MacGregor Burns observes, “Role-taking, carried to its ultimate degree, implies 
finally the absence of leadership (aside from the purely ceremonial), for the leader-actor assumes as 
many roles as society in all its component parts demands, and in doing so he mirrors society rather than 
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When a tantalizing opportunity to make a mark on history arises, one 
would expect an astute president to treat the long-term gains to his 
historical reputation from championing the rights of political minorities as 
greater than any costs that may be paid by his party (e.g., a momentary dip 
in public esteem, further polarization of the electorate, electoral losses by 
the party, even political realignment). This was precisely the calculation 
made by Lyndon B. Johnson when he famously quipped, “Well, what the 
hell’s presidency for?” in response to questions of why he was spending so 
much political capital on behalf of landmark civil rights legislation.30
Let us return, then, to the world before Obergefell v. Hodges;31 it was 
really not that long ago. Polls showed that since a high point of public 
opposition to gay marriage around 1996, resistance to the idea had steadily 
declined until 2010 or 2011, when more people began to support gay 
marriage than oppose it.32 Younger Americans increasingly embraced the 
policy of gay marriage, though there was nothing that could yet be 
described as a sustained majority or supermajority of voters committed to 
permanent change as a matter of national priority. In fact, crucial pockets 
of objection remained: one of every three Americans was not swayed by 
advocates of gay marriage, and a majority of black Americans generally 
and white evangelicals specifically continued to oppose legalization of gay 
marriage.33 Party affiliation also mattered: only 35% of registered 
Republicans favored a change in traditional marriage.34
For a new Democratic president who was already cautious by nature, it 
made sense to not identify the controversial issue of gay marriage as a high 
priority early on.35 In terms of agenda setting, other matters—such as 
                                                                                                                         
transforms it . . . . Far from being a slave to a role system, the great leader . . . may actually smash it 
and set up another system in which his roles are differently structured.” JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS,
ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX 486–87 (1956).
30 ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON, THE PASSAGE TO POWER xv (2012).
31 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees same-sex 
couples a fundamental right to marry).
32 Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage is Changing, and What It Means, N.Y.
TIMES, (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/how-opinion-
on-same-sex-marriage-is-changing-and-what-it-means.
33 In June 2015, the overall number of Americans opposed to same-sex marriage dropped to 39%. 
Support for Same-Sex Marriage at Record High, but Key Segments Remain Opposed, PEW RES. CTR.
(June 8, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/06/08/support-for-same-sex-marriage-at-record-
high-but-key-segments-remain-opposed/. Fifty-one percent of African Americans opposed gay 
marriage. Id. Broken down according to religion, seventy percent of white evangelicals opposed same-
sex marriage. Id. Republican support of the idea stayed around thirty-five percent. Id. A year later, the 
numbers are largely the same.  See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 
2017), http://www.pewforum.org/2016/05/12/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/.
34 Support for Same-Sex Marriage at Record High, but Key Segments Remain Opposed, supra
note 33.
35 Any shift in policy on gay marriage would not only have dominated the early days of Obama’s 
presidency, it would have also been an open repudiation of the policy of the last Democratic president, 
who signed DOMA into law.
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stimulating economic growth, reforming health care, and improving the 
international reputation of the United States after the Bush administration’s 
prosecution of the war on terror—appeared more urgent to White House 
officials. Additionally, the Supreme Court had already acted to ensure that 
the principle of sexual privacy extended to homosexuals and identified 
anti-gay animus as an illegitimate motivation for disadvantaging sexual 
minorities.36 For many politicians, these decisions reduced the overall 
sense of urgency over gay rights. Indeed, influential figures within the 
Obama administration thought it more important to preserve gains on this 
front rather than to extend rights if doing so risked undermining other 
priorities.  
Obama’s struggle with his own faith and public responsibilities also 
played a role in the cautious development of an equality-based 
understanding of the issue.37 As a candidate, Obama opposed gay marriage 
but supported civil unions,38 a compromise that did not damage his 
candidacy during the primaries. At that time, he paid no political price for 
his views because the social environment was in flux, with Democrats and 
gay-rights activists divided over whether to move more deliberately by 
supporting civil unions or instead to risk backlash by seeking recognition 
of same-sex marriage as a basic right of citizenship.39
In 2010, Obama described himself as conflicted whenever he was 
asked about gay marriage, with his views on the matter “evolving.”40 In his 
answers, Obama often referenced his religious upbringing along with his 
devotion to civic equality, but this ambiguity can be explained by a desire 
to position himself as a leader capable of bridging multiple constituencies: 
black and white, gay and straight, insider and outsider.41 Taking too many 
                                                                                                                         
36 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 637 (1996) (holding that an amendment to a state 
constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause by making homosexuals unequal to others); Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that gay people have the right to engage in private, 
consensual, sexual activity under the Due Process Clause). 
37 JO BECKER, FORCING THE SPRING: INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 120–21
(2014).
38 When asked about a questionnaire he signed as a candidate indicating his support for gay 
marriage back in 1996, Obama’s aides later claimed that he meant only endorsement of civil unions. Id. 
at 285.
39 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF 
GAY RIGHTS 142–44 (2002) (arguing that civil unions were more sustainable than gay marriage at the 
time). Activists who favored civil unions felt it critical to secure whatever support could be mustered 
for same-sex relationships, to build on those achievements, and to avoid the sort of backlash against 
gay rights that occurred when the Supreme Court of Hawaii declared a right to gay marriage under its 
state constitution. Pro-marriage activists, on the other hand, worried that support for civil unions might 
satiate the demand for legal change and harden the situation into a segregation-like status for gay and 
lesbian unions.
40 BECKER, supra note 37, at 268.
41 See id. at 294 (explaining that Obama “feared that embracing the same-sex marriage could 
splinter the coalition he needed to win a second term”).
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positions on hot-button issues can render a person unelectable as a national 
candidate. He would not be the first presidential candidate to finesse his 
policy positions, and he certainly will not be the last to do so. On questions 
of race, as with sexual orientation, Obama often spoke in inclusive but 
vague terms.42 As a policymaker, he tended to act even more deliberately, 
building support while avoiding the most controversial matters until he saw 
a way forward. 
President Obama would eventually announce his personal support for 
gay marriage on daytime television, but not until just six months before the 
2012 election, and only after Vice-President Joe Biden stole his thunder by 
publicly endorsing the cause.43 At the time, supporters of gay marriage 
within the administration believed the president to be sympathetic to the 
cause, but uncertain whether the timing was right in that sufficient numbers 
of Americans would support such an expanded theory of equality.44 Valerie 
Jarrett, a close confidant of the president and an important liaison to the 
gay community, lobbied Obama to come out in support of gay marriage.45
First Lady Michelle Obama also signaled to activists that the 
administration was working its way toward public support of gay 
marriage.46 And others who lobbied administration officials on the matter 
cited opinion polls showing a more receptive electorate, and made 
arguments emphasizing the president’s legacy and the importance of 
showing moral “character” in the eyes of voters.47
In other areas, Obama had no such reservations about extending equal 
protection of the law to sexual minorities, showing that presidential action 
was, in fact, being taken on gay rights in a variety of areas, but also that the 
                                                                                                                         
42 See id. at 296 (“I think it’s important to say that in this country we’ve always been about 
fairness, and treating everybody as equals.”).
43 Behind the scenes, some prominent figures, including Valerie Jarrett and Michelle Obama, 
urged the president to change his public stance to reconcile his public and private views, and to 
influence the public conversation. See BECKER, supra note 37, at 288–93. Biden’s comments in his 
interview with David Gregory on Meet the Press were not a trial balloon but unscripted; though months 
earlier, Obama had already asked aides to explore how he might explain a change in position. Id.;
Michael Barbaro, A Scramble as Biden Backs Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. Times (May 6, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/us/politics/biden-expresses-support-for-same-sex-marriages.html.
Pollsters began testing the various ways to describe gay marriage as a right. See BECKER, supra note 
37, at 288–93. Thus, Biden’s statements may have sped up the timetable, but a change in policy on gay 
marriage appeared already in the works.
44 Id. at 293–94.
45 Id. at 293.
46 See id. at 284 (“Hang in there with us, and we’ll be with you after the election.”).
47 See id. at 289. Biden, too, before his public statement in support of gay marriage, told the hosts 
of a private fundraiser in Los Angeles, “Things are changing so rapidly, it’s going to become a political 
liability in the near term for an individual to say, ‘I oppose gay marriage.’ Mark my words.” Id. Beyond 
acknowledging the changing social terrain, Biden also made a normative point, which is that he saw it 
the duty of the executive branch to reflect in law and policy a more expansive, popular theory of 
equality that encompassed same-sex marriage: “And my job—our job—is to keep this momentum 
rolling to the inevitable.” Id. at 286.
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administration prioritized marriage below equality in the military and 
workplace contexts.48 Obama had already begun the cautious process of 
dismantling “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the federal ban on gay soldiers 
serving openly in the armed forces. Repeal would eventually be certified in 
July 2011, after painstaking work suggesting that social support for a 
policy change would be supported not only by top military brass, but also 
by service members.49
Obama’s success on this matter stood in sharp relief from President 
Bill Clinton’s abject failure to change military policy so gay soldiers could 
serve openly in the early 1990s. A cautious, collaborative approach was the 
lesson Obama had drawn from President Clinton’s disastrous effort to lift 
the ban on gay military service only to swallow the bitter pill of “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell,” a legislative codification of the anti-gay personnel 
policy.50 Clinton had failed to do the hard work of tending to equality’s 
social foundations, and that inattention had incurred the wrath of military 
leaders, soldiers, and voters.51 President Clinton’s failed leadership strategy 
                                                                                                                         
48 For example, in a presidential candidate questionnaire, Obama indicated that he would support 
a non-discrimination policy for federal contractors that included sexual orientation and gender identity.
Stephanie Condon, Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) makes progress in the Senate, CBS
NEWS (Nov. 4, 2013, 8:08 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/employment-non-discrimination-act-
enda-makes-progress-in-the-senate/.
49 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on Certification of 
Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (July 22, 2011). See BECKER, supra note 37, at 265 (“More than 70 
percent [surveyed] said the effect of repealing the ban on gays and lesbians serving openly would be 
positive, mixed, or nonexistent, leading the study’s authors to conclude that the ban could be lifted with 
minimal risk to the current war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.”). A broadened notion of sexual 
equality was eventually codified in military policies: 
Service members will no longer be subject to administrative separation based solely on legal 
homosexual acts, a statement by a Service member that he or she is a homosexual or 
bisexual (or words to that effect), or marriage or attempted marriage to a person known to 
be of the same biological sex . . . . Sexual orientation will continue to be a personal and 
private matter. Applicants for enlistment or appointment may not be asked, or be required to 
reveal, their sexual orientation . . . . Enforcement of service standards of conduct, including 
those related to public displays of affection, dress and appearance, and fraternization will be 
sexual orientation neutral . . . . Harassment or abuse based on sexual orientation is 
unacceptable and will be dealt with through command or inspector general channels.
Memorandum from Clifford L. Stanley, Under Sec. of Def., Dep’t of Def., on Repeal of Don’t Ask 
Don’t Tell and Future Impact on Policy, to Secretaries of the Military Departments (Jan. 28, 2011).
50 By the time of Obama’s election, it became clear that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was an utter 
failure to the extent that one of the goals might have been to reduce the risk of witch hunts if service 
members kept quiet about their sexual orientation. In fact, some 13,000 troops were expelled from the 
military after the creation of the new policy, at a faster clip than before Clinton’s intervention. See
Bryan Bender, Continued Discharges Anger “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Critics, BOSTON GLOBE (May 
20, 2009), http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/05/20/continued_discharges
_anger_dont_ask_dont_tell_critics/ (showing gay rights advocates’ disappointment in Obama’s 
approach to integrating homosexuals into the military).
51 See BECKER, supra note 37, at 9–10 (“Clinton had already taken a beating for trying to end a 
policy that allowed the military to discharge a service member for being gay; he would up forced to 
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even sparked the vocal opposition of a fellow Democrat, Senator Sam 
Nunn (D-GA), who vowed to make Clinton pay a political price for 
blindsiding him with a plan for social engineering.52
Obama’s success in extending the principle of equality to military 
service showed how a nimble blend of pragmatism and idealism could 
result in real legal gains. Far from satisfying social progressives within the 
Democratic Party, however, this crucial victory merely stoked the hope for 
constitutional changes in other areas of life for gays and lesbians. In fact, 
as we shall see, the administration eventually leveraged legal changes that 
improved life for sexual minorities in the military setting to create a
broadened notion of equality in the domestic arena—most notably, on the 
issue of gay marriage.53
B. The Attorney General Repudiates DOMA
Until Obama announced his unequivocal support for gay marriage, 
other incremental steps had to be taken in the name of equality while trying 
to hold together a governing coalition.54 Making these changes balanced a 
variety of concerns, both partisan and principle. Collectively, they 
vindicated a position of equal dignity for gay Americans, but left the scope 
of any principles strategically vague. This tactical ambiguity as to the 
proper scope of equal protection of the law reflected not only electoral 
constraints, but also at least three other factors: (1) the importance of 
respecting appearances of the Presidency as an overtly law-enforcing body 
rather than an overtly law-making or law-interpreting body; (2) Obama’s 
own mix of legal and policy priorities; and (3) a belief that time was on the 
side of the pro-gay rights perspective because of changes in cultural 
attitudes about homosexuality.
                                                                                                                         
settle on a compromise policy called ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ that allowed gays and lesbians to serve 
only if they kept their sexual orientation hidden.”).
52 See Adam Clymer, Lawmakers Revolt on Lifting Gay Ban in Military Service, N.Y. TIMES,
(Jan. 27, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/27/us/lawmakers-revolt-on-lifting-gay-ban-in-
military-service.html (“Congressional resistance to President Clinton's promise to let homosexuals 
serve in the military broke into open revolt today, threatening to derail Democratic plans for quick 
passage of family-leave and health legislation.”). Not only did Senator Nunn vow to publicly oppose 
Clinton’s announced plan to end the ban on gays in the military, he also threatened to codify the ban in 
legislation when it previously represented merely military policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, too, 
including Colin Powell, vigorously and openly opposed a policy change at that time, with some 
military leaders using anti-gay epithets during these discussions. See Margaret Carlson et al., Then 
There Was Nunn, TIME, July 26, 1993 (describing the tensions between the Clinton administration and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,978951,00.html.
53 For war-dependent arguments deployed by President Obama in favor of gay marriage, as well 
as how such arguments can be leveraged in multiple domains, see Robert L. Tsai, Three Arguments 
About War, 30 CONST’L COMMENT. 1, 24–27 (2015).
54 This coalition consisted of not only the party faithful who wanted decisive action on gay rights, 
but also moderate voters who might be open to progress on these issues.
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Thus, plasticity in the president’s theory of equality served multiple 
political functions. By contrast, doctrinal ambiguity on the part of judges 
ordinarily serves very different purposes: showing deference to political 
actors, acknowledging access to imperfect information, and maintaining 
the appearance of stability in the law by reducing the sheer incidence of 
mistakes and reversals.
Then a key turnabout occurred on gay marriage. By letter dated 
February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder informed Congress of the 
administration’s intention to change its legal position on the 
constitutionality of DOMA.55 For two years, consistent with the president’s 
“evolving” view on gay marriage, DOJ had continued the prior 
administration’s policy of defending the law as a reasonable legislative 
prerogative while assuring constituents that the president “opposed” 
DOMA on principle and would work for its legislative repeal.56 This 
somewhat passive strategic position did not satisfy gay rights activists and 
donors, but it did reflect the president’s own uncertainty over whether laws 
recognizing only traditional marriage should be treated as hostility towards
sexual minorities, and it allowed the administration to make progress on 
more pressing agenda items without being embroiled in a major social 
values debate.
Suddenly, in a dramatic sea change in enforcement policy,57 DOJ 
lawyers would no longer defend the law in court, having determined that 
“heightened scrutiny” should apply to DOMA and that under this more 
stringent standard, the law should fall. If DOMA proved to be 
unconstitutional after DOJ’s own internal analysis, then government 
lawyers could not and would not defend the law in court as a matter of 
principle and duty.  
In a striking move, the administration pled a plethora of changed 
circumstances to justify the government’s newfound refusal to defend the 
                                                                                                                         
55 Letter from Eric Holder, Atty. General, to Congress (Feb. 23, 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-
act.
56 E.g., Declan McCullagh, Gay Rights Groups Irate After Obama Administration Lauds Defense 
Of Marriage Act, CBS NEWS (Jun. 12, 2009, 6:56 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gay-rights-
groups-irate-after-obama-administration-lauds-defense-of-marriage-act/ (“As a presidential candidate, 
Barack Obama claimed ‘we need to fully repeal the Defense of Marriage Act,’ . . . . This week, the 
Obama administration is facing the ire of gay rights groups after it filed a brief in California federal 
court defending the Defense of Marriage Act . . . .”).
57 This decision was itself contentious within DOJ, with Holder overruling at least two deputies, 
including Neal Katyal, acting Solicitor General, and Tony West, head of the Civil Division. See Sari 
Horwitz, After Overruling Top Justice Department Lawyers on DOMA, Holder Feeling Vindicated,
WASH. POST (June 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-
department-had-debated-handling-of-law-denying-benefits-to-gay-couples/2013/06/27/06e56304-df4d-
11e2-b94a-452948b95ca8_print.html (explaining that Attorney General Eric Holder viewed the 
Supreme Court’s ruling against the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act as a victory for equal protection in 
the United States).
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law.58 The press release issued by the Attorney General’s office the same 
day the letter was delivered to congressional leaders confirmed this line of 
argument for public consumption: “Much of the legal landscape has 
changed in the 15 years since Congress passed DOMA. The Supreme 
Court has ruled that laws criminalizing homosexual conduct are 
unconstitutional. Congress has repealed the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell policy. Several lower courts have ruled DOMA itself to be 
unconstitutional.”59
There is a lesson here about constraints and opportunities. Shifting 
social conditions can create an opening to take decisive executive action on 
a matter of individual rights, but they also can serve as independent 
rationales for a course of action. Holder’s letter proved to be a textbook 
example of these insights as the Obama administration staked out a new 
theory of equality. First, the collection of occurrences gave the impression 
that anti-gay fervor in other institutions had waned, and that the president 
was no longer resisting the mobilized sentiment of the people by defending 
the rights of sexual minorities—something that might have been the case 
back when Clinton signed DOMA into law. Moreover, the letter implied
that the president saw it as his job to respond to changes in public 
sentiment and in the law. The Obama administration appeared to 
characterize the current Congress as no longer hostile to gay marriage,
predicting that it would be unlikely to resist a broadened theory of equality.  
Second, Holder noted that “new” DOMA cases were being litigated in 
the Second Circuit, a jurisdiction “which has no established or binding 
standard for how laws regarding sexual orientation” should be reviewed.60
In other words, social activism in the courts had presented DOJ with a
fresh opportunity to reconsider an inherited policy (though it might be 
noted that the president had the power to rethink his constitutional view at 
any time). 
Third, a series of adverse judicial decisions softened the Obama 
administration’s resolve to support DOMA (which was already weak given 
its inherited position in tension with the Democratic Party’s platform),61
causing lawyers and policymakers (like many other Americans) to rethink 
                                                                                                                         
58 Letter from Eric Holder, Atty. General, to Congress, supra note 55.
59 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving 
the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-
general-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act.
60 Letter from Eric Holder, Atty. General, to Congress, supra note 55.
61 The Democratic Party platform calls for “the full repeal of the so-called Defense of Marriage 
Act,” based on broadly stated principles of equal dignity: “We support the right of all families to have 
equal respect, responsibilities, and protections under the law. We support marriage equality and support 
the movement to secure equal treatment under law for same-sex couples.” Democratic Party Platform 
Drafting Committee Releases Language of Pro-Marriage Plank, FREEDOM TO MARRY (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/blog/entry/democratic-party-platform-drafting-committee-releases-
language-of-pro-marri.
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their views. Once they did so, a new interpretation of the Constitution
emerged.
Note, too, that progress on gay rights in other domains then became an 
independent reason for making progress on the marriage question, 
suggesting an irresistible force to the logic of those earlier actions. I have,
in another context, called attention to this form of jurisprudential 
bootstrapping, whereby constitutional actors leverage gains on one issue to 
make progress on another issue.62 But here it makes sense to see it as a 
broader approach to advancing rights by creating the impression of 
irreversible cultural and legal change, whatever the truth might be.  
Repeal of the ban on gay military service is the most dramatic change 
invoked as part of this bootstrapping strategy, one initiated by the Obama 
administration itself, though it is carefully portrayed here in more popular 
and deferential terms—as a reflection of Congress’s considered judgment 
and as evidence of legislative support for gay rights.
What is going on here is complicated, and we have to make educated 
guesses based on what political actors say publicly and what we know to 
be the social constraints acting on this kind of high-profile decision.63 At 
the outset, we should lay on the table the foundational principle that the 
power to enforce the law is committed explicitly by the Constitution to the 
president. Most authorities on this subject agree that this enforcement 
power includes the discretion not to enforce a law deemed 
unconstitutional, though they differ on the exact scope of this power.64 For
                                                                                                                         
62 See Robert L. Tsai, Three Arguments About War, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 26 (2015) (showing 
how President Obama “bootstrapped the military service question into the one about marriage, 
implying that action on one front ineluctably leads to progress on the other”).
63 At some point, when internal legal memoranda and notes are available and biographies are 
written, we may gain a richer view of what happened.
64 See David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-
Enforcement Power, 63 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 63–64 (2000) (“This article challenges the court-
centered approach to the scope of the President’s non-enforcement power.”); see also Neal Devins & 
Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 508–510 (2012) (“The 
belief that the President must enforce and defend laws that he thinks unconstitutional is widely held, 
although there is substantial disagreement over the obligation’s scope.”); Dawn Johnsen, The Obama 
Administration’s Decision to Defend Constitutional Equality Rather than the Defense of Marriage Act,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 599, 602–03 (2012) (addressing the issue of “the proper scope of presidential 
interpretive authority pervad[ing] government”); Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of 
Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8, 10 (2000) (“Constitutional 
commentators, as well as the political branches of our federal government, continue to debate the 
existence and parameters of the President’s authority to refuse to enforce constitutionally objectionable 
statutes. . . . In this article, I consider the legitimacy of what I will term ‘presidential non-
enforcement.’”); Walter Dellinger, Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional 
Statutes (Nov. 2, 1994), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc110294.html (“We do not believe that a 
President is limited to choosing between vetoing, for example, the Defense Appropriations Act and 
executing an unconstitutional provision in it. In our view, the President has the authority to sign 
legislation containing desirable elements while refusing to execute a constitutionally defective 
provision.”).
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his part, Holder acknowledged the reality of “vast discretion” enjoyed by a 
president in enforcing the laws.65 Why, then, were his explanations for the 
administration’s rejection of DOMA far more complicated than they 
needed to be? The answer is that, on such a controversial matter, President 
Obama wanted to present a principled solution, one that did not seem mere 
capitulation to partisan interests, the usurpation of another branch’s 
powers, or the abdication of the Chief Executive’s duty to enforce federal 
law.
C. Appearances Matter: Collaboration or Unilateralism?
It is against this backdrop of popular expectations that Holder’s 
explanation makes the most sense. What we are interested in, for the 
moment, is the role constitutional analysis played in Holder’s explanation 
to Congress and the American public. Overall, the approach could be 
understood as equal parts predictive, justificatory, and popular. President 
Obama allowed the Attorney General to make this announcement, framing 
gay marriage as a matter of what the rule of law required rather than what 
some constituents desired. The announcement itself was predictive in the 
sense that it tried to anticipate what the U.S. Supreme Court might do once 
it squarely addressed the constitutionality of DOMA (though as we have 
learned, the Court itself frequently reaches decisions without agreeing on 
general methods). This orientation appealed to citizens and elites 
accustomed to ideas of judicial supremacy, without actually taking this 
position openly and committing to it. No president would surrender his 
power to another branch unequivocally, but the appearance of institutional 
acquiescence can pay political and social dividends.
Not all presidential efforts take a predictive orientation toward rights 
development (sometimes it’s intended to be corrosive of prevailing judicial 
interpretations), and so DOJ’s orientation was notably predictive rather 
than combative.66 But unilateral or anti-judicial actions (and even those 
                                                                                                                         
65 Called before the House Committee on Judiciary to explain his turnabout on the enforcement of 
DOMA, Attorney General Holder stated: “There is a vast amount of discretion I think that a President 
has, and, more specifically, that an attorney general has, but that discretion has to be used in 
appropriate way so that you are acting consistent with the aims of the statute, but at the same time, 
making sure that you are acting in a way that is consistent with our values, consistent with the 
Constitution, and protecting the American people.”  Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. 2d Sess. (2014) (statement of Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States). Holder’s 
further explanation of the president’s enforcement power reveals that it entails a combination of legal 
and value judgments.
66 The Obama administration took a more combative posture with respect to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on voting rights, especially a president’s own power under Section Five of the 
Voting Rights Act. After the High Court’s ruling in Shelby County v. Holder, President Obama stated, 
“Today’s decision invalidating one of its core provisions upsets decades of well-established practices 
that help make sure voting is fair, especially in places where voting discrimination has been historically 
prevalent.” Press Release, White House Off. of the Press Sec’y, Statement on the Supreme Court 
Ruling on Shelby County v. Holder (June 25, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
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that merely appear to be unilateral or anti-judicial) can be more costly to
sustain than those that appear to be, or are in fact, collaborative projects. 
For better or for worse, the courts themselves have often taken the view 
that presidential actions supported by another branch of government are 
more likely to be constitutional, and that unilateral presidential acts are 
more vulnerable to challenge.67 If nothing else, such rulings confirm a 
traditional preference for socially grounded assertions of law.
DOJ lawyers sought to supplement and render the existing law of 
equality more coherent, rather than undoing what the Justices had wrought. 
But make no mistake: despite its self-presentation, the Obama 
administration was still making individual rights law and interpreting the 
Constitution more broadly than its counterparts. Holder’s letter was 
justificatory in that it offered a host of reasons for the shift in enforcement 
policy. It acknowledged Congress’s prerogative to make the laws, and 
sought only to explain the administration’s considered judgment in
refusing to defend the law. This respectful posture also tried to preempt 
criticism that the non-enforcement decision was a partisan one or based on 
Obama’s personal preferences. What the Constitution requires instead, and 
what Holder took pains to emphasize had occurred, was a presidential 
decision based on “careful consideration, after review of [the Attorney 
General’s] recommendation.”68
The legal analysis was defensive in the general posture struck as the 
executive branch tended to the social plausibility for expanded rights. 
Holder characterized DOJ’s own equality-making activity as mere gap 
filling: where there are gaps in the law, it can hardly be said to be usurping 
judicial review for political actors to reach their own good-faith conclusion 
about what the Constitution requires.69 Although experts might accept that 
the power to enforce encompasses the power of non-enforcement, ordinary 
                                                                                                                         
office/2013/06/25/statement-president-supreme-court-ruling-shelby-county-v-holder. Holder went even 
further, calling the Court’s ruling “a serious and unnecessary setback,” with “the potential to negatively 
affect millions of Americans across the country.” Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, Remarks on the Supreme 
Court’s Decision in Shelby County v. Holder, DEPT. OF JUST. (June 25, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-supreme-court-
decision-shelby-county-v.
67 Justice Robert Jackson’s Steel Seizure Case concurrence stands for this view. See Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President 
acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own 
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”).
68 Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act, supra
note 59.
69 See, e.g., Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on 
Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, to the Honorable Abner J.
Mikva, Counsel to the President (Nov. 2, 1994), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc110294.html 
(displaying the consensus approach of the Office of Legal Counsel, which usually permits greater 
presidential creativity on a constitutional question when the U.S. Supreme Court has remained silent).
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people (and by extension, their elected representatives) might not hold 
such a sophisticated view. Refusing to enforce a law sounds lawless and 
tyrannical, especially if a president can pick and choose which laws to 
enforce. 
The expectation of the Obama administration must have been that the 
president’s discretionary action was more palatable, and more likely to be 
treated as legitimate, when cast in constitutional principles.  Importantly, 
this general orientation is consistent with the long-standing view of the 
professional class—most of the lawyers that, at one time or another, offer 
legal opinions on behalf of the executive branch.70 The message conveyed 
through the Attorney General’s resort to judicial decisions, then, was that 
President Obama cared deeply about the rule of law as well as the 
protection of political minorities. He believed himself duty-bound to rise to 
the occasion based on his independent determination as to what the law 
demanded, especially when other institutions proved indecisive.
Maintaining the appearance of executive-judicial cooperation was 
especially important because Congress had already spoken explicitly on
this issue by denying that equality was seriously implicated by 
heterosexual marriage (this was the central message of DOMA, after all). 
The makeup of Congress had most certainly changed, and the prospect of 
passing a similar law in 2011 had waned—these were all factors to 
consider in deciding just how aggressive a president should be in 
disowning a duly enacted law. But even if the Obama administration 
expected Congress to acquiesce to the president’s view on this issue, the 
impression of inter-branch coordination could go some way in reducing 
excessive heat around a controversial matter and smoothing the path
toward a different socio-political consensus.
D. The Scope of the Right
The Attorney General hedged his bets by saying that he would merely 
refuse to defend DOMA in the courts.71 In all other respects beyond 
                                                                                                                         
70 See, e.g., Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, on Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions, to Attorneys of the Office, 
(July 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice-
opinions.pdf (outlining how the Office of Legal Counsel provides controlling advice to the executive 
branch on questions of law).
71 As a number of experts pointed out, this transitional approach to DOMA was fraught with 
practical complications. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Defense of Marriage Act, Will You Please Go 
Now!, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 155, 165 (2012) (“The complications of DOMA have begun to 
reveal themselves in earnest as the same-sex marriage and its equivalents have spread across the 
country.”). Some have gone further, claiming that the position was incoherent and should have gone 
further. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty, The Obama Administration’s Decisions to Enforce, But Not 
Defend, DOMA § 3, 106 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 69, 75 (2011) (contending that the 
Administration’s decisions were “incoherent and unprincipled”).
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litigation, he would enforce the law deemed by the president to be 
unconstitutional until such time as the courts ruled conclusively on the 
matter. This compromise in February 2011—indicating only a partial 
willingness by DOJ to follow through on the president’s legal judgment 
that sexual orientation triggers heightened review—signaled a desire to 
deny the imprimatur of the rule of law to DOMA, while allowing public 
sentiment to sort itself out regarding other gay rights issues and giving the 
courts a role to play.72 It represented an effort to announce a new 
constitutional principle of equality and the methodology to be utilized by 
presidential actors, but to sever those features of constitutional lawmaking 
from the question of enforcement.  
To be sure, the bolder move by far would have been to carry out the 
administration’s new interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and to 
present it to the world as a fait accompli. Doing so would have been a 
powerful implementation of the executive branch’s revised theory of 
equality. But such a strategy would also have been a boon for opponents of 
gay marriage, incensing the institutionally cautious along with social 
conservatives, and possibly provoking a more negative reaction from the 
courts than necessary. It was apparent, too, that the president did not wish 
to say anything that might help anti-gay marriage forces in states 
considering the question legislatively or via referendum. Executive branch 
creativity at the state and local levels had prompted an outcry, as some 
mayors and county clerks, interpreting their own obligations under state 
and federal law, began unilaterally handing out marriage licenses to same-
sex couples.73 Many observers condemned those actions as illegal acts of 
defiance, and the consequences of such a reaction at the national level 
would be even greater, where an outcry obscuring the constitutional stakes 
might be crippling for a nascent right.74
                                                                                                                         
72 When President Obama ultimately decided to support gay marriage, he publicly cast the move 
in terms of the Golden Rule, a time-honored way of popularly describing the concept of equality. 
Transcript: Robin Roberts ABC News Interview With President Obama, ABC NEWS (May 9, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-robin-roberts-abc-news-interview-president-obama/story
?id=16316043. The rhetorical approach put the burden squarely on those who oppose a right to justify 
an exception to this basic notion of fairness. It also draws on an idea that exists in a cross-section of 
religious traditions, implying that a believer, too, can support marriage equality.
73 Importantly, these actions suggested that any socio-legal consensus over the right of marriage 
as purely a heterosexual institution might no longer hold. 
74 After Obergefell, resistance by county clerks and other state and local officials occurred 
sporadically. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Despite Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, Resistance Persists, CNN
(June 30, 2015, 10:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/30/us/same-sex-marriage-supreme-court-
ruling-holdouts/index.html (detailing the various public officials who refused to issue marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples or who voiced their opposition to doing so). For the most part, courts treated the 
refusal to issue a marriage license to same-sex couples as improper defiance of the law rather than 
evidence of a wholesale rejection of the constitutional principle. See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 
924, 944 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (explaining that a county clerk in this situation is refusing to fulfill her lawful 
duties, but failing to state that she rejects the constitutional principle). 
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Plentiful other evidence suggested that the president wished to signal a 
cautious executive approach, even after this turnabout on DOMA.
Although DOJ announced that “heightened” review would be applied in 
the future by the administration to matters involving sexual orientation, 
nowhere did Holder try to specify whether intermediate or strict scrutiny 
was most appropriate.75 The administration may only have been parroting 
the Supreme Court’s own strategic ambiguity on this matter, for even in 
pro-gay rights decisions like Romer and Lawrence, the Court avoided 
specifying which tier of scrutiny was required for laws that implicate 
sexual orientation.  
But I wish to tease out a very different set of legal and political 
benefits when executive branch actors rely on conceptual vagueness in 
evaluating rights. First, so long as DOMA was eventually struck down, the 
administration could claim credit for predicting the outcome and 
vindicating constitutional rights. Thus, we can imagine the possibility of a 
political dividend if a president was later proven to be farsighted, as well as 
stalwart, in defending the ideal of equality. That a president might be later 
proven correct—and even heroic—through historical judgment should not 
be underestimated. 
This long view is a powerful reputational consideration that can be 
harnessed on behalf of individual liberties. But even a decisive loss in the 
Supreme Court, if it came, might not undermine the political gains from 
seizing a leadership role on a matter of national importance. A certain 
ambiguity about the full scope of gay rights can therefore facilitate a 
steadier commitment to rights and incremental gains by an administration, 
even more so than confident proclamations of principle followed by 
embarrassing retreats.
Second, Holder’s position rendered it harder to accuse the president of 
interfering with the judicial function because he did not behave in a way 
that undermined the High Court’s prerogative or undercut any of its 
rulings. Thus, the president appeared to be gently nudging the courts in the 
direction jurists apparently had already charted, and filling gaps along the 
way, rather than usurping a coordinate branch’s powers.  
Third, such ambiguity about what a commitment to equality requires 
preserved a great deal of policy discretion within the executive branch. 
Even after announcing that some sort of heightened review should apply to 
laws based on sexual orientation, lawyers and policymakers could still 
theoretically take the view that on some policy matters—say, in certain 
security situations—being cognizant of sexual orientation may be 
permissible. If a president did later decide to make exceptions to the 
                                                                                                                         
75 The answer could be intermediate review for all laws implicating sexual orientation, strict 
scrutiny for all laws implicating sexual orientation, or middle tier review for some kinds of laws and 
strict scrutiny for others.
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administration’s new concept of equality, he could make refinements 
without disavowing the principle as a whole.
For our purposes, this shift in legal terminology and mechanism should 
be seen for what it was, namely, the announcement of a major change in 
enforcement policy and the development of a theory of equality with wider 
implications. The fact that an executive-made right looks different from a 
juridically-constructed right affects its scope and effectiveness, but should 
never be mistaken for a lack of coherence or commitment. It is simply 
evidence that a constitutional right in action looks different in the political 
sphere than it does in the judicial sphere.  
To see this potentially far-reaching effect on the scope of the right, 
keep in mind that DOJ could have simply argued that DOMA reflected 
anti-gay animus, without taking the additional position that sexual 
orientation triggered heightened scrutiny. That position would have put it 
squarely within Romer. But the administration wanted to put gay rights on 
even sounder footing—to endorse that shining language in Lawrence that 
gestured toward (but did not fully explicate) a more robust notion of civic 
equality for sexual minorities. By adopting heightened scrutiny, the 
administration signaled that the scope of equality should extend well 
beyond a do-no-harm approach and should approximate something closer 
to full participation in civic life. Citing the landmark sex equality ruling 
Frontiero, the Attorney General argued that “there is a growing 
acknowledgment that sexual orientation ‘bears no relation to ability to 
perform or contribute to society.’”76
The president’s theory of equality did Lawrence one better in another 
respect—institutionally—by inviting the Court to join hands with the 
White House to promote equality, in the spirit of cooperation. This was
both opportunistic and likely to be effective, because the president: (1) 
acted preemptively by removing the specter of executive-branch 
repudiation of judge-created rights; (2) offered the Court political cover for 
pro-gay decisions by taking the leadership position on these matters (and 
thereby drawing some political reaction to Obama and his party); and (3) 
presented jurists with more raw material with which to say that social 
consensus had changed sufficiently that a jurisprudence of equality for 
sexual minorities now made sense.
Where doctrinal space remains for the Court to act without altering 
doctrine dramatically, and the executive branch has reason to believe the 
Court might adopt its preferred view on rights, a facilitative orientation can 
be more productive in creating a durable consensus over rights.77
                                                                                                                         
76 Letter from Eric Holder, Atty. General, to Congress, supra note 55 (quoting Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
77 A president can always claim later that the Supreme Court went off the rails, or did the right 
thing but did not go far enough.
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Indeed, Holder’s letter reminded his audience that President Obama 
had already taken a number of noteworthy actions to advance civic 
equality for sexual minorities with the support of the American people. The 
administration had secured the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” on the 
principle that “sacrifice, valor and integrity are no more defined by sexual 
orientation than they are by race or gender, religion or creed.”78 If the 
Supreme Court desired to fashion a socially responsive jurisprudence,79
then the administration offered material support for such a project.
In the meantime, much could be done within the president’s spheres of 
influence on gay rights, while cases churned slowly through the legal 
system. Given DOJ’s new imperative, regulations and policies that denied 
rights or benefits on the basis of sexual orientation should be revisited 
under the Attorney General’s directive, and if found wanting, revised or 
reinterpreted. State laws that negatively impacted the rights of sexual 
minorities now could be said to affect a national interest, namely the 
federal constitutional principle of equal protection of the law, allowing 
more frequent monitoring and intervention by the federal government in 
state and local conflicts. DOJ’s theory of equality also empowered actors 
within the administration—lawyers, appointees, or even just lower level 
aides across a variety of departments—to fight to expand rights on behalf 
of sexual minorities by enforcing agency rules or filing lawsuits.
Another reason for resorting to the intricacies of legal analysis to 
justify the exercise of political discretion is to gain an offensive advantage:
gaps in judicial case law provide opportunity, political cover, and the raw 
materials for decisive, and sometimes highly creative, political action. In 
this instance, Holder argued that judicial inaction at the level of the 
Supreme Court and at least one circuit court justified reconsideration of 
enforcement policy and more robust presidential action. Along the way, he 
recycled judicial language and past judicial rulings, adapting them toward 
new goals, and indeed, on behalf of a more aggressive agenda on gay 
rights.
Note, too, that Holder’s letter explicitly rejected appellate court 
decisions that used rational basis scrutiny for sexual orientation. The 
administration’s view was that any judicial ruling was outdated (or lacked 
sufficient social foundation) to the extent it rested on assumptions 
                                                                                                                         
78 Letter from Eric Holder, Atty. General, to Congress, supra note 55.
79 There is some evidence that Justice Kennedy, for instance, is particularly sensitive to arguments 
about having a socially responsive jurisprudence—i.e., interpretations of law that do not fall too far 
outside of existing political and social sentiment, or hinder the development of such attitudes.  See, e.g.,
Saiju George, On Liberty: The Moral Concepts of Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence (2014) 
(unpublished Law School Student Scholarship Paper, on file with Seaton Hall Law School) (discussing 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)) (“Kennedy cites to the ‘evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society,’ social science research, and international law to provide 
‘objective referents’ for the moral content of liberty.”).
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articulated in Bowers v. Hardwick and later overturned by Lawrence.80
Though the Supreme Court had not yet determined the full scope of either 
Lawrence or its repudiation of Bowers, the Obama administration 
confidently did so: rulings adverse to gay rights that invoked Bowers were 
tainted, Holder stated, and DOJ now read Lawrence as having announced 
general principles of liberty and equality that must be implemented as a 
matter of law. DOJ lawyers would no longer cite Bowers as precedent nor 
adopt its claim that rational basis review was the appropriate baseline for 
sexual orientation-dependent laws.
Moreover, as a matter of presidential policy, lawyers rejected the 
“procreational responsibility” justification for DOMA as “unreasonable,” 
instead embracing the immutability of sexual orientation as most 
compatible with “recent social science understandings.”81 The letter went 
on to apply these principles to DOMA, finding the law wanting. Notably, 
Holder cited statements in the legislative record “expressing moral 
disapproval of gays and lesbians and their intimate and family 
relationships—precisely the kind of stereotype-based thinking and animus 
the Equal Protection Clause is designed to guard against.”82
This last bit served as the strongest evidence that a sex/sexual 
orientation analogy drove at least some of the president’s theory of 
equality. To the extent laws expressed hostility towards sexual minorities 
or were based on unfounded generalizations about sexuality, they were
unconstitutional. In a footnote, Holder made clear that laws intended to 
“correct” homosexual behavior as anti-social defied the state of modern 
science: “some of the discrimination has been based on the incorrect belief 
that sexual orientation is a behavioral characteristic that can be changed or 
subject to moral approbation.”83
                                                                                                                         
80 Recall that the Lawrence Court explicitly overruled Bowers precisely because it lacked social 
grounding. First, The Bowers ruling’s claim that anti-sodomy laws had “ancient roots” was erroneous. 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003). Rather, the decision’s “historical premises are not 
without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.” Id. at 571. Second, the number of anti-sodomy 
laws in the United States had in fact dwindled. Id. at 572. That fact, coupled with a strong pattern of 
non-enforcement of those laws, suggested a weakening even of contemporary norms. Id. Third, Bowers
had been eroded by not only subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, but also that of the 
European Court of Human Rights. See id. at 573 (detailing the case of an adult male resident of 
Northern Ireland who was denied his right to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The European 
Court of Human Rights held that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European 
Convention on Human Rights). 
81 Letter from Eric Holder, Atty. General, to Congress, supra note 55.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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E. The Vice-President and President Offer a Popular Defense of Equality
On May 4, 2012, Meet the Press host Mark Gregory asked Vice-
President Joe Biden for his view on same-sex marriage. “What this is all 
about is a simple proposition,” he answered. “Who do you love, and will 
you be loyal to the person you love?”84 Pressed further, Biden clarified that 
“[t]he president sets the policy” but that he personally was “absolutely 
comfortable with the fact that men marrying men, women marrying 
women, and heterosexual men and women marrying one another are 
entitled to the same exact rights, all the civil rights, all the civil liberties.”85
Biden’s comments, though couched as unofficial, amounted to a 
powerful statement about equality, one that rendered the stakes in the 
simple terms of affection, devotion, and equal regard. His conception of 
equality also seemed unequivocal in that “the same exact rights” must be 
extended to same-sex couples for their commitments to satisfy 
constitutional demands. 
Although Biden’s endorsement of gay marriage was unscripted, 
President Obama’s public announcement five days later was both poll-
tested and carefully orchestrated. The President sat down with Robin 
Roberts in an exclusive interview for Good Morning America. In 
announcing his support for same-sex marriage for the first time, Obama 
made three noteworthy moves. First, like Biden, he characterized the 
principle as one of basic “fairness, and treating everybody as equals.” He 
further elaborated the point that equality must be forward-looking and 
practical by referencing his own children, saying a ban on same-sex
marriage “doesn’t make sense” to them because it treated gay parents of 
their friends differently from their own parents.86
Second, Obama defended the principle in explicitly religious terms, 
required by the example of “Christ sacrificing himself on our behalf,” as 
well as “the Golden Rule,”87 that is, the injunction to treat others as one 
would like to be treated. This offered a moral content to the principle of 
equality beyond that of secular requirements to treat people fairly, and it 
                                                                                                                         
84 BECKER, supra note 37, at 288–89. As Becker tells it, the president’s aides were hoping for 
greater control over the timing of the president’s statements and felt rushed to hurry his own views into 
public so as not to give the impression of “leading from behind.” To some extent, this will always be 
true, but any political and legal gains to be had from conveying firm leadership on an issue can be 
dissipated by the impression that one feels forced to act by circumstance rather than out of principle.
85 Felicia Sonmez, Biden ‘Comfortable’ with Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST (May 7, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-comfortable-with-same-sex-marriage/2012/05/06
/gIQASQDf7T_story.html?utm_term=.84164dee6b7a.
86 BECKER, supra note 37, at 296. 
87 Id. The Golden Rule, a Christian formulation of equality, is attributed to a saying of Jesus: “So 
always treat others as you would like them to treat you; that is the Law and the Prophets.” Matthew 
7:12.
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also presented an opposing moral discourse to counter the religious-
traditionalist view of heterosexual marriage as sacrosanct. In fact, refusing 
to cede the moral terrain, the president claimed that support for same-sex 
marriage is “consistent with our best and in some cases our most 
conservative values, sort of the foundation of what made this country 
great.”88
Together, Obama’s appeal to religious and ethical sources of law 
obviously went beyond what judges would generally do today in their 
positivist formulations of the Equal Protection Clause. But his rhetoric also 
simplified the stakes, rendering them more easily understood by non-
lawyers and grounding them in older traditions. Even if judges declined to 
treat the principle of egalitarianism in such moral terms, the president’s 
own language helped pave the way for broader social support for an 
outcome that benefited sexual minorities.
Third, Obama engaged in jurisprudential bootstrapping, leveraging 
gains in other social domains on gay rights to help advance a theory of 
equality that encompassed same-sex marriage. He said: 
When I think about—those soldiers or airmen or marines 
or—sailors who are out there fighting on my behalf—and 
yet, feel constrained, even now that ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ 
is gone, because—they’re not able to—commit themselves in 
a marriage. At a certain point I’ve just concluded that—for 
me personally, it is important to go ahead and affirm that—I
think same-sex couples should be able to get married.89
There are several smaller moves that make up the bootstrapping 
argument. First, changes in military policy should be treated as evidence of 
social progress. Second, that progress was incomplete in other domains. 
Third, social progress in the military domain justified further legal gains in 
non-military domains, including in those not directly controlled by the 
president (i.e., state laws governing marriage).90
Still, all three facets of Obama’s primetime articulation of popular 
egalitarianism struck a principled stance while accounting for strategic 
concerns. The most immediate concern was the president’s reelection 
efforts, for he and others worried that supporting same-sex marriage might 
depress turnout among socially conservative voters in the African-
American and Hispanic communities, as well as among white working 
                                                                                                                         
88 Id.
89 Transcript: Robin Roberts ABC News Interview With President Obama, supra note 72.
90 As a matter of pure logic, it needn’t follow that legal changes in one policy mandate change in 
another policy. The contexts may be so dramatically different that legal changes are unsuitable in some 
contexts given different policy goals; or perhaps it is a question of who gets to decide. Here, the 
bootstrapping argument is therefore a way of blurring differences, and overcoming these objections by 
stressing the same social condition that ought to be given primary importance in decision making.
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class Catholics.91 By couching his support for same-sex marriage in 
explicitly ethical and religious terms, by appealing to family and 
traditionalism, and by referring to the importance of fairness for military 
families, Obama hoped to minimize any political costs associated with 
supporting a broader notion of equality. 
His overall presentation appeared to follow the advice of advisors who 
believed that Obama had been out-of-step with his own base on same-sex 
marriage, that many Republicans themselves were becoming increasingly 
ambivalent about the issue, and that more political and legal gains could be 
made by staying slightly ahead of the curve because same-sex marriage 
would someday become the law of the land.92 In other words, decisive 
leadership by the president could help establish the right to same-sex 
marriage on stable footing in the law and society as a whole, while 
persuadable voters would likely acquiesce to that outcome at some point.
With internal DOJ obstacles removed to full-throated development of a 
new conception of equality, and with the President’s and Vice-President’s 
powerful endorsements of same-sex marriage as a matter of national legal 
concern, the table was now set for a vigorous display before the courts.
II. FROM WINDSOR TO OBERGEFELL: AN OPPORTUNITY REALIZED
Well before the same-sex marriage rulings, other decisions by the 
Supreme Court had hastened, rather than arrested, this trend in rights 
development. From Romer onward, the justices had repeatedly rejected 
anti-gay laws, often on incompletely theorized accounts of equality, 
substantive rights, and without agreeing to the proper doctrinal framework. 
Critically, Lawrence not only struck down laws that criminalized 
consensual sex between partners of the same sex, but also swept away 
Bowers, along with its associated arguments that moral opprobrium alone 
was sufficient to treat gay people unfairly. The cumulative effect of this 
jurisprudence had been to invite political actors—not just grassroots 
activists and lawyers but also presidential actors—into the fray to do more 
to protect the rights of sexual minorities. With the previous 
administration’s theory of equality repudiated as it related to same-sex 
marriage, the Obama administration obliged by joining forces with pro-
marriage advocates before the courts. That involvement had a profound 
impact on how jurists perceived the national stakes of their interpretation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.  
                                                                                                                         
91 BECKER, supra note 37, at 294.
92 One of those advisors was Ken Mehlman, an openly gay Republican who founded Project 
Right Side, an organization that strove to convince Republicans that gay marriage was consistent with 
conservatism and made for good politics. His advice to Obama about how to talk about same-sex 
marriage was based in part on polling. See id. at 289–96.
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The gay marriage decisions by the Supreme Court—first Windsor, then 
Obergefell—appeared to vindicate the administration’s legal position. 
Those judicial rulings, coming on the heels of a major shift by the 
executive branch, signaled to the public that, just as the president had 
claimed, fundamental constitutional rights were at stake in the battle over 
gay marriage. Importantly, popular support for the pro-marriage position 
did not noticeably erode after the Windsor ruling or after the increase in 
public scrutiny of the Obama administration’s siding with pro-marriage 
forces. If that had occurred, it might have caused aides to wonder whether 
a jurisprudence that encompassed same-sex marriage was socially 
untenable. To the contrary, lower courts and many ordinary people treated 
that ruling as consistent with the view that DOMA amounted to 
unjustifiable discrimination.93
A. The Windsor Brief: DOJ Makes Its Case
On February 22, 2013, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr., filed the 
government’s brief in the Windsor case. For the first time, the Obama 
administration advanced its theory of Equal Protection of the Laws to 
require marriage for gay and lesbian couples.94 That brief largely tracked 
Holder’s letter, and in recounting the procedural history of the case, 
devoted two full paragraphs to the president’s changed legal position. This 
recitation emphasized several themes discussed earlier: a principled, good-
faith reevaluation of the constitutionality of DOMA in light of changed 
social conditions; certitude on the part of administration lawyers that 
DOMA now violated the ideal of equality; and respect for both Congress 
and the judiciary through the president’s decision to stop defending
DOMA in the courts while pressing for the Supreme Court to render “a 
definitive verdict against the law’s constitutionality.”95
Notably, the brief argued that social conditions now favored the 
recognition of gay marriage as a constitutional right.96 First, sufficiently 
                                                                                                                         
93 Polls showed waning support for DOMA-type laws even before the Court’s Windsor decision.  
E.g., Jonathan Capehart, Americans are Done With DOMA, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/02/19/americans-are-done-with-doma/.  
Polls afterward have not shown a backlash to the Court’s involvement on this issue. E.g., Susan Page, 
Poll: Support for Gay Marriage Hits High After Ruling, USA TODAY (July 1, 2013), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/07/01/poll-supreme-court-gay-marriage-
affirmative-action-voting-rights/2479541/; William Saletan, Anti-Gay is Yesterday, SLATE (June 26, 
2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/2013/06/gay_marriage_polls_and
_public_opinion_the_supreme_court_s_rulings_upheld.html.
94 Brief for the United States on the Merits Question at *12, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (Feb. 22, 2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 683048.
95 Id. at *5.
96 See id. at *12–16 (“There is broad scientific and medical consensus that sexual orientation is 
typically not a voluntary choice, and that efforts to change an individual's sexual orientation are 
generally futile and potentially harmful. In any event, as long as it distinguishes a group, a 
34 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1
oppressive conditions against sexual minorities persisted, justifying not 
only enhanced doctrinal tools such as “heightened scrutiny” by the courts
but also a more robust jurisprudence of equality and liberty.97 Going well 
beyond Holder’s letter to Congress, the Solicitor General’s brief recounted 
all of the historical forms of anti-gay discrimination, with an emphasis on 
governmental actions to intimidate and subordinate sexual minorities: anti-
sodomy laws, anti-gay employment and immigration laws, widespread 
incidence of hate crimes, unequal child custody laws, unfair police 
enforcement of criminal laws, and ballot initiatives repealing legal 
protections for gays and lesbians.98 While defenders of DOMA minimized 
the duration and significance of this history of discrimination, the Solicitor 
General urged the High Court to see that “given its breadth and depth, the 
undisputed twentieth-century discrimination has lasted long enough” to 
merit enhanced protections for sexual minorities.99
Second, insisting that sexual orientation “bears no relation to ability to 
perform or contribute to society,” Verilli’s brief pointed to two sources of 
new information: (1) more recent, considered scientific views of 
homosexuality; and (2) the President’s own actions to end the military’s 
ban on service by gay Americans. The brief quoted the American 
Psychiatric Association’s position statement that “homosexuality per se 
implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social 
or vocational capabilities.”100 Given this social-scientific fact, the 
government argued, sexual orientation should be legally treated like other 
suspect classifications (i.e., gender, race, religion), in that one’s sexual 
preference “bears no inherent relation to a person’s ability to participate in 
or contribute to society.”101
In the same vein, “the broad consensus in the scientific community 
was that, for the vast majority of people (gay and straight alike), sexual 
orientation is not a voluntary choice” and that “efforts to change an 
individual’s sexual orientation are generally futile and potentially 
dangerous to an individual’s well-being.”102 For these reasons, the 
administration argued that sexual orientation is an “obvious, immutable, or 
distinguishing characteristic” meriting strict scrutiny.103
                                                                                                                         
characteristic may support application of heightened scrutiny even if - as with illegitimacy or alienage -
it is subject to change or not readily visible.”).
97 Id. at *5.
98 Id. *22–27.
99 Id. at *27.
100 Id. at *28 (quoting American Psychiatric Ass’n, Position Statement on Homosexuality and 
Civil Rights (1973), reprinted in 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 497 (1974)).
101 Id. at *28.
102 Id. at *31.
103 Id. at *31–32.
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Additionally, government lawyers made the identical jurisprudential 
bootstrapping argument that President Obama himself used in his public 
words on gay marriage and Holder previewed in his letter to Congress, 
namely, that the end of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” provided a reason to 
vindicate the pro-gay marriage view. That Congress and the Obama 
administration ended the discriminatory practice should be taken as proof 
that scientific judgments about homosexuality have also been embraced by 
society at large, even among some of its more conservative institutions.  
Verilli’s brief quoted the President’s remarks during the signing of the 
repeal: “[V]alor and sacrifice are no more limited by sexual orientation 
than they are by race or by gender or by religion or by creed.”104 This 
amounted to a political judgment as much as an institutional and cultural 
one, but as far as the administration was concerned, it was a judgment that 
should now be generalized as a legal one. 
Third, the United States rebutted the argument of DOMA’s defenders 
that social conditions did not yet support “experimentation” with marriage 
as a matter of judicial intervention.105 In other words, they insisted that the 
courts should defer to Congress’s judgment that such rights should be 
developed on a state-by-state basis. But as the Solicitor General argued, 
this kind of prudential argument has been raised before in other contexts 
such as school desegregation—and usually rejected when the rights of 
national citizenship are at stake.106 The brief also made an interesting 
fairness argument: DOMA was not crafted as a “temporary” or 
“provisional” law,107 and it contained no sunset provision. Given DOMA’s 
harshness, the argument to “proceed with caution” appeared to be an effort 
to indefinitely deny the rights of a political minority.
                                                                                                                         
104 Id. at *28. In President Obama’s original remarks, he went on to say that gay soldiers have 
always served with honor and distinction; the only thing that changed was they could now do so 
openly: “There can be little doubt there were gay soldiers who fought for American independence, who 
consecrated the ground at Gettysburg, who manned the trenches along the Western Front, who stormed 
the beaches of Iwo Jima. Their names are etched into the walls of our memorials. Their headstones dot 
the grounds at Arlington.” Barack Obama, Remarks by the President and Vice President at Signing of 
the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010 (Dec. 22, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2010/12/22/remarks-president-and-vice-president-signing-dont-ask-dont-tell-repeal-a.
In this way, Obama orally rewrote sexual minorities back into the constitutional history of this country. 
He would go further, situating his theory of equality within an older view of pluralism: “For we are not 
a nation that says, ‘don’t ask, don’t tell.’ We are a nation that says, ‘Out of many, we are 
one.’ (Applause.) We are a nation that welcomes the service of every patriot. We are a nation that 
believes that all men and women are created equal. (Applause.) Those are the ideals that generations 
have fought for. Those are the ideals that we uphold today.” Id.
105 Brief for the United States on the Merits Question, supra note 94, at *50–51.
106 Id. at *50.
107 Id. at *50–51.
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B. Windsor Vindicates the Government’s Position
On March 27, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled for Edith Windsor, who 
had been married to a woman under New York law and was subsequently 
denied a spousal deduction on her federal taxes due to DOMA.108 Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion declaring DOMA to be a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause characterized New York’s same-
sex marriage law as an effort “to correct what its citizens and elected 
representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier known 
or understood.”109 By creating the institution of same-sex marriage, New 
York “conferred upon [these couples] a dignity and status of immense 
import.”110 DOMA interfered with a state’s traditional power over marriage 
and denied these couples the status and dignity conferred by law. Notably, 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion treated marriage not as a static institution, but 
rather as a complex, cultural institution that has evolved with time.111
Although the Supreme Court declined advocates’ invitation to call 
sexual orientation a suspect classification, it did find several points of 
concord with the administration. First, the Solicitor General had argued 
that DOMA denied the effects of “state-recognized marital relationships 
across the entire spectrum of federal law.”112 The Court agreed, noting in 
Windsor that DOMA “enacts a directive applicable to over 1,000 federal
statutes and the whole realm of federal regulations. And its operation is 
directed to a class of persons that the laws of New York, and of 11 other 
States, have sought to protect.”113
Second, the Court emphasized the dignitary and tangible harms of 
DOMA to families, and especially the children of same-sex parents. Justice 
Kennedy wrote that the federal law “humiliates tens of thousands of 
children now being raised by same-sex couples” and “makes it even more 
difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their 
own family and its concord with other families in their community and in 
their daily lives.”114 He also stressed the “financial harm to the children of 
same-sex couples.”115 As the Solicitor General’s brief had emphasized, the 
denial of benefits “undermines the efforts of same-sex couples to raise 
their children, hindering rather than advancing any interest in promoting 
child welfare.”116 To be sure, the administration’s brief was not the only 
                                                                                                                         
108 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
109 Id. at 2689.
110 Id. at 2692.
111 See id. at 2689 (describing the evolving societal norms and changes in the laws regarding 
marriage in New York).
112 Brief for the United States on the Merits Question, supra note 94, at *53.
113 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
114 Id. at 2694.
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one that made these points, but DOJ’s stature as a respected repeat player 
in the High Court gave its characterization of the law’s effects great 
credibility.
Beyond grounding its decision in the social conditions in which 
marriage actually operates for thousands of families, the Court’s actions 
helped to present a unified front that marriage equality was a matter of 
national significance and constitutional dimension. The administration’s 
repudiation of DOMA appeared to be vindicated by the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Windsor, which seemed jurisprudentially cautious at the time, for 
it did not give a ringing endorsement of same-sex marriage as a substantive 
right.117 Instead, the Justices simply asked whether federal law could treat 
lawfully married same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples.  
The decision did give the Obama administration considerable useful 
material for the promotion of sexual orientation-based equality if it chose 
to do so. If anything, the Court’s decision signaled to the president that (a) 
the Court would not object to the president’s far-reaching theory of 
equality and (b) the Justices would give the administration both time and 
resources to advance a pro-rights agenda. Rather than create obstacles to 
the President’s theory of equality, Windsor’s selective judicial ratification 
of the administration’s position hastened executive-based lawmaking in 
this area.  
C. Post-Windsor Actions by the Executive Branch
During the period between the two gay marriage decisions, executive 
branch officials took aggressive steps to lay down a firmer foundation for 
same-sex marriage. Collectively, these actions responded to party pressures 
and movement goals, but did so in a way that indicated the broader 
objective of constitutional transformation rather than the mere satisfaction 
of constituent interests. After Windsor, presidential actors repeatedly and 
expressly relied on the Supreme Court’s language and reasoning for their
own ends, seeking to entrench a gay marriage-friendly conception of 
equality.
1. Holder’s Speech to HRC
On February 8, 2014, Attorney General Holder gave a speech to the 
Human Rights Campaign (HRC), the nation’s largest gay rights 
organization, as a way of signaling continued support by the President for a 
                                                                                                                         
117 The closest the Court came to doing so was one line that cited Lawrence v. Texas and this 
characterization of same-sex marriage: “[t]he differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and 
sexual choices the Constitution protects, see Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, and whose 
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broadened theory of equality.118 By giving this speech before such a 
prominent group, Holder acted as a kind of political patron for HRC’s legal 
ideas and the social movement associated with its work. Holder’s actions 
both authorized and mainstreamed their grassroots labors, nurturing 
intellectual and political relationships that valued a theory of equality that 
encompassed gay rights.119
During Holder’s widely-publicized speech,120 he first noted the role of 
HRC and the gay rights movement in promoting “opportunity and equal 
justice under law.”121 He said that “[f]or President Obama, for me, and for 
our colleagues at every level of the Administration,” LGBT rights 
remained “a top priority.”122 Holder vowed that any legal changes on this 
front would be “historic, meaningful, lasting change.”123
Importantly, Holder also took credit for progress on gay marriage and 
offered a defense of presidential leadership. He reminded the audience that 
executive action, backed by social activism,124 had led to the disavowal of 
DOMA, and eventually, the Windsor ruling. A belief in “our common 
humanity” animated the work of the DOJ across a variety of issues, 
including the enforcement of the Violence Against Women Act and the 
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Act.125 The 
administration’s theory of equality, which now encompassed marriage 
rights for gay couples, should be seen as opening “a new frontier in the 
fight for civil rights.”126
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Then, the Attorney General announced it would be taking specific 
steps to “advance” the “fundamental truth” of equality “and to give real 
meaning to the Windsor decision.” DOJ would issue “a new policy 
memorandum that will—for the first time in history—formally instruct all 
Justice Department employees to give lawful same-sex marriages full and 
equal recognition, to the greatest extent possible under the law.”127
At a crucial moment in his performance, Holder went out of his way to 
acknowledge the gay rights movement as a natural successor to the black 
civil rights movement of the 1960s, and stated that the stakes over the 
struggle for same-sex marriage “could not be higher.”128 No more 
extravagant call could be made to draw together members of the 
Democratic Party’s traditional base to forge a broad coalition to do the 
hard work of egalitarianism: 
[G]ay and straight, bisexual and transgender. Black and 
white. Young and old—whether they live in Washington or 
Wyoming; Massachusetts or Missouri. Whether they work in 
schools or restaurants—on Wall Street or Main Street.  And 
whether they contribute to our nation as doctors or service 
members; as businesspeople or public servants; as scientists 
or as Olympic athletes.129
This statement captured the administration’s intention to harness the 
power of popular sovereignty to promote a vigorous, presidentially-
directed conception of equality—through interest group politics, 
bureaucratic resources, and the rule of law. 
The purpose of this historical comparison would soon become 
apparent: to help justify DOJ’s function as an engine for transformative 
legal change. “[T]he Justice Department’s role in confronting
discrimination must be as aggressive today as it was in Robert Kennedy’s 
time,” Holder stated.130 Most Americans, especially those committed to 
social justice, remembered the 1960s as an exemplar of executive branch 
leadership and legal wisdom on matters of equality. That institutional 
history and example had to be repeated. Holder closed by committing the 
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administration’s vast resources to promoting gay marriage: “[I]n every 
courthouse, in every proceeding and in every place where a member of the 
Department of Justice stands on behalf of the United States—they will 
strive to ensure that same-sex marriages receive the same privileges, 
protections, and rights as opposite-sex marriages under federal law.”131
2. The Feb. 10, 2014 Legal Memo
Two days later, by memo dated February 10, 2014, Attorney General 
Holder celebrated the Windsor decision as “an enormous triumph for equal 
protection under the law for all Americans,” and he issued further 
guidelines to all department employees announcing how the ruling should 
be implemented within the president’s sphere of influence.132 Consistent 
with President Obama’s robust theory of equality, Holder announced 
DOJ’s policy “to the extent federal law permits, to recognize lawful same-
sex marriages as broadly as possible.”133 Despite the fact that some states 
still resisted the concept of gay marriage as a matter of morality and local 
prerogative, the administration would enforce the general policy that “all 
marriages [were] valid in the jurisdiction where the marriage was 
celebrated.”134
The DOJ took these steps to enforce the Supreme Court’s ruling as 
broadly as possible, in as many contexts as possible.  In this way, the 
president’s agents sought to disseminate and bureaucratize his theory of 
equality. Although none of these programs were contested during the 
Windsor litigation,135 federal benefit programs, victim compensation funds, 
bankruptcy laws, Bureau of Prison policies, and ATF policies that turned 
on marriage status would henceforth be interpreted to be available to same-
sex spouses on the same terms as to straight couples.136
Moreover, unless it was “infeasible,” the Attorney General directed 
lawyers to take litigation positions such that any references to marriage in 
federal laws be read to include valid same-sex marriages.137 Marital 
privileges recognized during any judicial process would be treated the 
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same.138 In these ways, presidential action sought to alter the social 
conditions in which the right to same-sex marriage would be ultimately 
determined.
Soon enough, two cases, Obergefell v. Hodges and Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, would give the administration a fresh opportunity to extend its new 
approach to equality.139
3. DOJ’s Amicus Brief in Obergefell
The United States was not a party to either case, but decided to file an 
amicus brief on behalf of the same-sex couples both times. In the 
Hollingsworth case, the same-sex couples won in the Ninth Circuit on a 
narrow ground. Instead of treating same-sex marriage as a fundamental 
right or concluding that strict scrutiny was required any time the state used 
sexual orientation as a classification, Judge Reinhardt’s ruling simply held 
that Proposition 8, which had overturned the California Supreme Court’s 
pro-same-sex marriage ruling, stripped a minority group of its rights 
without a rational justification.140
If possible, DOJ’s amicus brief in Hollingsworth sounded even more 
forceful than the one filed in Windsor, especially in its insistence that 
equality represented a paramount national concern and priority for the 
Obama administration. The brief announced at the outset, “The United 
States has a strong interest in the eradication of discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation.”141 First, by making same-sex marriage a national 
priority, the administration gave the Court political cover for a more 
generous reading of the Constitution. Second, by repeatedly quoting the 
Court’s own words in Windsor back to the Justices, the Solicitor expressed 
substantive agreement with the Court’s broader language and rationales of 
equality and liberty. DOJ lawyers drastically minimized the tepid rational 
basis approach exemplified by the holding in Romer v. Evans, leading 
instead with plentiful references to Windsor’s concern for the dignity and 
status of civil marriage, language about the connections between “personal 
decisions” and “liberty” from Lawrence, and Loving v. Virginia’s
declaration that “the freedom to marry has long been recognized as . . . 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.”142 Third, the brief reassured 
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the Justices that the Obama administration would vigorously enforce a 
strong opinion in favor of same-sex couples.
While the government’s brief repeated many of the doctrinal 
arguments from its brief in Windsor, it also bolstered those arguments with 
the work of historians and other scholars who work on human rights and 
sexuality. For instance, lawyers drew from the work of Dale Carpenter 
documenting official policies of hostility towards lesbian and gay people, 
such as civil institutionalization, sterilization, and castration.143 They also 
cited Michael Klarman and Robert Wintemute for the proposition that 
“efforts to combat discrimination against lesbian and gay people have 
engendered significant political backlash,” which demonstrated their 
relative political powerlessness and warranted judicial intervention to 
secure their rights.144 In this way, the government offered resources to the 
Justices for the finding of accurate social facts about the status of sexual 
minorities in America, as well as context for understanding the social 
meaning and effects of bans on same-sex marriage.  
A culturally adaptive reading of the Constitution made the most sense, 
the government argued, because “earlier generations may have failed” to 
even consider the possibility of these kinds of unions. One line in the brief 
exemplified the government’s plea to take the social context into account:
“[I]t is not the Constitution that has changed, but the knowledge of what it 
means to be gay or lesbian.”145
A. Obergefell as Institutional Consensus
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Obergefell. That ruling, authored by Justice Kennedy, articulated a concept 
of marriage that implicated both principles of liberty and equality. Notably, 
in describing marriage as an institution of constitutional dimension, the 
opinion cited the administration’s recounting of all of the ways that the 
states “have throughout our history made marriage the basis for an 
expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities.”146 In 
fact, Justice Kennedy wrote, “[t]he States have contributed to the 
fundamental character of the marriage right by placing that institution at 
the center of so many facets of the legal and social order.”147 That is, 
constitutional adjudication had to grapple with marriage as a contemporary 
institution rather than as a social good that was frozen in time.
                                                                                                                         
143 Id. at *4 (quoting Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 253 (2013)).
144 Id. at *20 (citing MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR 26–29 (2012);
ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 56 (1995)). 
145 Id. at *23 (quoting Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1218 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation 
omitted)).
146 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
147 Id.
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While the Justices did not go as far in Obergefell as President Obama’s 
preferred theory of equality,148 neither did they decisively reject it. The 
Supreme Court found a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, offering 
clarity as to its nature in a way that will aid proponents of the new right 
while antagonizing opponents. And critically for our purposes, leaving the 
scope of equality partly unresolved gave committed political actors room 
to push further. 
Decisive presidential action on this front nevertheless encouraged the 
Justices to take that final step toward a new social convergence over rights. 
After all, having ruled in Windsor that the federal government’s treatment 
of same-sex marriages implicated both tangible and symbolic 
constitutional interests, it would have been a tall order to say in Obergefell
that states suddenly had a legitimate reason to violate those exact interests.
While a technical possibility as a matter of cool logic, a secondary-right 
approach to gay marriage (equality is required only if a state chooses to 
offer gay marriage) would have undermined the general, autonomy-based 
terms of Windsor.
To be sure, there are few guarantees in life. It was theoretically 
possible for the Court to conclude in Obergefell that no substantive right to 
gay marriage existed as such or that states enjoy a power to regulate the 
moral welfare of the people in a way that is not entrusted to the federal 
government. But doing so would have risked inflaming both sides in the 
dispute rather than ratifying what appeared to be a broadening political 
settlement of the issue, one in which a president had made a decisive
intervention. The Obama administration’s public repudiation of DOMA 
confirmed to the High Court that public opinion had shifted significantly 
on gay marriage, clarified the constitutional stakes raised by the question, 
and gave the Justices a measure of political cover to strike down federal 
and state DOMA’s. DOJ lawyers cited earlier judicial rulings to justify a 
broadened view of equality, and their actions, in turn, gave the Justices the 
social support to expand their own jurisprudence.  
Presidential leadership on gay marriage did not guarantee the outcome
in Obergefell, but it did help alter the social conditions in which jurists 
wrestled with the issue, making a pro-gay rights outcome far more likely. 
Not only would there be no risk of presidential defiance of such a ruling, 
President Obama offered to serve as an active partner to enforce 
egalitarianism as a national principle—including by defending that right 
against recalcitrant states. Additionally, the administration’s aggressive 
posture within its own domain took maximum advantage of the role of 
                                                                                                                         
148 For instance, Justice Kennedy’s opinion did not state that heightened review was required for 
all laws implicating sexual orientation. Nor did he spell out any substantive constitutional right to 
marriage, finding only that the federal government could not treat same-sex marriages differently once 
states decided to sanction such unions.
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time to ground its theory of equality in areas that might not have been the 
subject of immediate litigation. The more areas in which the administration 
could codify policies and practices that extended benefits and protections 
on the basis of gay marriage, the more the social terrain would necessarily 
be changed each time a future court faced a question involving questions of 
sexual orientation.  
Instead of operating in a social environment devoid of law, the 
Supreme Court in Obergefell had to contend with the prospect that a 
negative ruling, one that read the Constitution in a parsimonious fashion, 
would make the judiciary appear out of step with popular sentiment. This 
was not merely a matter of following what is fashionable, but actually goes 
to the legitimacy of the court, for rulings that are too far out of the 
consensus—that begin to appear socially implausible, taking both the 
present and future into account—risk making the courts appear culturally 
irrelevant. After all, the lesson drawn from Bowers was that a decision 
whose historical foundations were suspect to begin with, and whose logic 
and social support later “sustained serious erosion,” would start to cast 
doubt on the Court’s own wisdom and authority.149
In this case, a decision the other way could certainly have been 
defended in the abstract or based on older, but perhaps outdated, social 
views of marriage, but how long would such a ruling last before pressure to 
revisit its reasoning reemerged? Moreover, if the Supreme Court refused 
the president’s invitation to lay down a cooperative vision of sexual 
equality on this issue, the Court would have ceded the ground of principle 
to the presidency, rather than claiming some credit for keeping the 
principle of egalitarianism both salient and effective.  
When the Obergefell ruling came down in a way that established a 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage, it then recognized that a social 
consensus had been reached among national institutions on this matter.  
Only then could it be fairly said that a majority’s political preferences 
became established initially as social, and ultimately, constitutional norms. 
Still, it should be said that a claim of convergence will eventually be tested 
by dissenters, something all such claims to cultural governance must face.
How should we think about social convergence on constitutional 
norms? Though influential, Robert Dahl’s work offers far too crude a 
formula for why rulings by the Supreme Court might be considered 
“majoritarian,” but he was absolutely right to treat the other branches of 
the national government as essential parts of the social context in which 
judicial decisions are made.150
                                                                                                                         
149 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–76 (2003). 
150 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 281 (1957).
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The president seized a leadership role on gay marriage by endorsing 
the work of activists;151 the Supreme Court approved that course of action
by authoring equality-based opinions, and Congress offered mostly 
institutional acquiescence, especially after DOMA’s demise. Importantly, 
the judicial outcome allowed both the Presidency and the judiciary to rise 
to the occasion and join forces to establish new constitutional norms while 
pursuing their own, separate institutional prerogatives. It gave President 
Obama an opportunity to declare political victory, which he did by 
wrapping his arm around the Obergefell ruling and treating it as a 
vindication of his own leadership to transform individual rights,152 and 
offered additional material—arguments, rationales, and momentum—for 
whatever equality initiatives remained on his agenda. 
One of those matters later turned out to be North Carolina’s HB2 law, 
which required individuals to use bathrooms that corresponded to their sex 
as identified on their birth certificate.153 Lawyers in the administration 
subsequently drew on this approach to equality to find that such bathroom 
laws constituted impermissible sex-based discrimination. By opening up 
such new fronts in the battle over human sexuality and sex roles in society, 
however, opponents of social progress-based theories of equality will have 
new opportunities to challenge claims of social convergence over legal 
norms.
III. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OVER 
RIGHTS
A. Neither Simple Obedience Nor Pure Politics
As the Obama administration’s experience with same-sex marriage 
confirms, the dynamics surrounding the presidential creation of individual 
rights are more complicated and far-reaching than most models of rights 
                                                                                                                         
151 In making this point, I do not mean to denigrate the work of activists, lawyers, and ordinary 
citizens who toil on issues of rights. Quite the contrary: their activity is crucial to the formation of new 
legal vocabulary, the pressuring of governmental institutions, and generation of momentum for legal 
change. My point is simply that such efforts, if they are to produce lasting change, must be directed to 
the gears of government as efficiently as possible, and that among the most influential factors in 
judicial decision making are the views of the President and Congress.
152 President Obama called Jim Obergefell personally to congratulate him on the legal victory, and 
in his speech publicly endorsed the ruling as a crucial step that “made our union a little more perfect.”  
Clip of President Obama on Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, C-SPAN (June 26, 2015), http://www.c-
span.org/video/?326809-1/president-obama-reaction-supreme-court-samesex-marriage-ruling. He 
called it a vindication of the principle of equal treatment of all people, “regardless of who they are or 
who they love.” Id. More important, he took credit for defending that principle vigorously, before and 
after the Supreme Court’s own episodic interventions. “My administration has been guided by that 
idea,” Obama said, reminding the American people that his leadership has led to “real progress for 
LGBT Americans in ways that were unimaginable not too long ago.” Id.
153 H.R. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016).
46 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1
currently allow. A conventional story about judicial supremacy affirms that 
judges alone create rights, which political actors are then required to take 
on as their own—but this explanation goes only so far. Such theories tend 
to treat political actors as passive receptors for juridic theories of rights, 
rather than active proponents of their own theories of rights. They are also 
defective in a normative sense, by departing from the tradition of popular 
sovereignty and the ideal of co-equal branches of government.  
The executive branch has, in fact, internalized many methods of 
interpreting the laws, by establishing the Department of Justice and the 
White House Counsel’s Office, but also by creating legal departments 
within most agencies to foster responsive and specialized legal advice. A
professional rule of law culture has been fostered by attorney-advisors, 
past and present, who valorize service to the Office of the Presidency 
rather than to individual presidents.154
Still, the simple account of constitutional law making does not fully 
grasp the full range of choices facing political actors who might, but need 
not always, resort to juridic language or methods to enforce individual 
rights.  There are times when progress on matters of rights can be made 
more effectively when not cast explicitly in liberty or equality terms at 
all.155 Presidents might tell the world they are not making rights but are 
merely defending an “original” Constitution. This can be more of a
strategic ploy rather than an accurate description of their legal ambitions.
As already illustrated, the benefits from selective reliance on juridic 
methods and from paying homage to the myth of judicial supremacy can be 
partly political, and partly legal. Departures from legal methodology do not 
always damage rights. Quite the contrary: being cognizant of political and 
social conditions can more effectively secure rights for the long term.  
                                                                                                                         
154 See, e.g., Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice on Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions (July 16, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf (“OLC 
opinions should consider and ordinarily give great weight to any relevant past opinions of Attorneys 
General and the Office.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 516 (1993) (“On this point, the Office has tended to believe that its client is the 
institutional presidency, not any particular President.”). To be sure, how a president makes use of such 
legal advice is a different matter, and depends on his or her agenda and views about the relative 
competencies of various legal advisors. 
155 The rights of inmates and undocumented aliens come to mind. Rights discourse can galvanize 
already sympathetic communities, but also trigger vehement reactions from citizens who will deny that 
such groups should enjoy full or partial rights. This helps to explain why procedural approaches, with 
their generalist structure and application, are frequently favored over substantive approaches, which 
can highlight social group differences. See, e.g., Tammy W. Sun, Equality by Other Means: The 
Substantive Foundations of the Vagueness Doctrine, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 149, 152 (2011)
(“Our system has striven rather unsuccessfully to minimize the potential for abuse primarily by erecting 
safeguards that review prosecutorial and law enforcement decisions for adherence to procedural 
values.”).
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At the same time, it would be a mistake to see presidential leadership 
on rights as merely an unprincipled recapitulation of ordinary politics. It 
involves sophisticated, popular law making—every bit as high-minded and 
binding as juridical processes when it is successful. An executive-based 
conception of rights will be powerfully shaped by political interests, but it 
will also tend to have more integrity than one might expect of a mere 
policy change. Such a right will be especially effective in areas within the 
executive branch’s spheres of authority, since not every action or policy 
will face judicial review.  
An executive-based conception of a right often bears the hallmarks of 
lasting decisions, usually through powerful articulations of legal principles 
combined with strategies to entrench a presidential theory of rights across 
multiple institutions and social domains. That way, a legal right can be 
preserved by different kinds of departmental rules and organizational 
practices (though it may be vulnerable to those separate dynamics as well).
Once an institutional convergence over rights has been reached, it can be 
difficult to dislodge without expending significant political capital. A 
robust executive defense of rights is never presented as merely the one-
time satisfaction of narrow constituent interests, but rather as a position 
informed by foundational values.  
It is always theoretically possible for a new administration to alter its 
views on the scope of any particular right,156 and this is an inherent 
weakness in the model of presidential leadership. Nevertheless, there are 
reasons to expect more continuity between administrations on rights than 
one might think. The key is the degree to which a particular right can be 
said to be well grounded as a social practice. Consider the following 
factors that militate against full-bore reversal of executive-based rights 
with each presidential succession:
1. Practical governance constrains the transformation of rights. If a new 
party gains control of the Oval Office, its political prospects now turn 
on the ability to govern rather than a capacity to undermine a political 
regime. Thus, a successful leader will avoid taking unnecessary,
ideologically polarizing positions, especially those that strengthen the 
hand of the party in the minority in terms of counter-mobilization and 
distracting from a president’s priorities.
2. Rights in action are associated with constituencies. In the eight years 
during which a party typically controls the presidency, the people may 
become reliant on the right in question. Every right creates 
                                                                                                                         
156 For instance, the Trump administration has staked out different views about the proper scope 
of voting rights, abortion rights, the rights of sexual minorities, religious exemptions to civil rights 
laws, and perhaps others too.
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constituencies, and those constituencies may try to punish a president 
and his party if they publicly oppose a cherished right. Parties, social 
groups, and their allies use rights to increase electoral gains, either by 
defending rights or challenging them.157
3. Rights are enmeshed in social reality through institutional practice. In 
the meantime, a president has enjoyed some success entrenching his 
view of the right in question by appointing ideologically friendly 
judges, authoring executive orders, enacting regulations, authoring 
policies and memos, creating new bureaucracies, or taking other 
actions within his sphere of influence to disseminate and codify the 
right. 
4. Judicial endorsement of presidential action is the gold standard, 
though legislative assent comes a close second. In the meantime, 
courts may have explicitly embraced the legal views of the past
president during litigation, thereby adopting it as legal doctrine. Once 
such socio-legal consensus is achieved, it becomes more difficult and 
costly to disturb (in terms of bureaucratic and cultural resistance, as 
well as political resources that could be spent elsewhere). In lieu of 
judicial endorsement of a theory of rights, congressional approval can 
help raise the costs of reversal by a president’s successor.158
                                                                                                                         
157 Social Security offers the best historical example. As Franklin Roosevelt famously observed, 
the goal of using the payroll tax mechanism was “to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political 
right to collect their unemployment benefits.” ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW 
DEAL, 1933–1935, at 308–09 (1958). He bet that “[w]ith those taxes in there, no damn politician can 
ever scrap my social security program.” Id. The Republican White House and Republican-controlled 
Congress are currently in the midst of testing this socio-legal insight as it relates to national healthcare: 
whether the American people truly think of healthcare as a socially grounded right (something that has 
obtained legal or, perhaps in the hopes of Obamacare’s most ardent defenders, a quasi-constitutional 
status) or whether it is merely a socio-legal entitlement that can be curtailed or repealed whenever any 
party wins one election cycle. See, e.g., Steve Benen, GOP senator: Health care coverage is ‘a 
privilege,’ not a right, MSNBC (Oct. 2, 2017, 9:20 AM) (quoting one Republican Senator as saying, “I
think [healthcare is] probably more of a privilege [than a right].”). The Republican Party’s facility with 
mobilizing gun rights constituencies is another, more recent illustration.
158 The Obama administration’s end to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” certified by the military and 
approved by Congress, embraced a theory of equality as it relates to sexual orientation in the military, a 
domain in which courts have struggled to create enforceable rights. Later presidents might disagree, but 
the costs of trying to reverse such a ban, given congressional and agency approval, is almost certainly 
too high to pay. The issue of torture might be another area, where judicial norms against cruelty have 
now been approved by Congress, which then allows advocates and elected officials to argue that the 
issue has become “settled law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2012) (banning “cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment” of any prisoner of the U.S. government); Alexander Bolton, Top Senate 
Republicans: Torture Ban is Settled Law, THE HILL (Jan. 25, 2017, 1:42 PM), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/316113-top-senate-republican-torture-ban-is-settled-law (“Those 
issues are settled law. Congress has spoken.” (quoting Senator John Thune)). 
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5. Not all presidential tactics are equal. Certain kinds of executive 
actions are more easily reversed than others. An executive order can be 
rescinded by a successor president and a legal opinion by the Office of 
Legal Counsel can be recalled by the Attorney General, but that 
assumes no significant constituencies have arisen that are dependent on
that right. It also assumes Congress has not codified the course of 
action into law (and courts have not required that course of action as a 
matter of law).
6. Rights transformations are usually asymmetrical. In the politics of 
leadership, it looks worse to be a president who takes rights away as 
opposed to one who gives new rights to the people, so we should 
assume, absent an emergency, an asymmetrical quality to rights 
discourse that favors the preservation or expansion of existing rights.159
Actions perceived as depriving a constituency of rights are expected to 
be more costly,160 and if curtailment is successful, more susceptible to 
reversal by successors or other institutions. 
7. The degree of social grounding of rights is the ultimate test of 
longevity.  The more that an individual right can be entrenched across 
governmental agencies, a variety of political and legal texts, and 
bureaucratic practices, the more stable that right is. This is what it 
means to put rights into action.
Keep in mind, too, the various ways that judicial interpretations of 
rights are less stable and complete than commonly believed. Any judicial 
declaration of rights must be enforced by others and is therefore subject to 
fear of defiance in its very formulation. Furthermore, the fractured nature 
                                                                                                                         
159 For instance, Executive Order 9066, which created the mechanism for the wartime internment 
of Japanese Americans, has damaged FDR’s historical reputation. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 
1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). Likewise, many will say that the authorization of torture permanently stains 
George W. Bush’s presidency.
160 The Trump administration announced that it would retain the government workplace non-
discrimination rules that include sexual orientation established by President Obama. Jeremy W. Peters, 
Obama’s Protections for L.G.B.T. Workers Will Remain Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/obama-trump-protections-lgbt-workers.html. In 
explaining its adherence to sexual orientation equality in this sphere, the White House statement cited 
the fact that Trump “continues to be respectful and supportive of L.G.B.T.Q. rights, just as he was 
throughout the election . . . . The president is proud to have been the first ever G.O.P. nominee to 
mention the L.G.B.T.Q. community in his nomination acceptance speech, pledging then to protect the 
community from violence and oppression.” Id. This and other episodes suggest there are several kinds 
of constraints that can favor continuity of executive-based legal and constitutional norms: philosophical 
agreement with a predecessor, reputation-enhancing benefits from appearing to be a strong leader not 
beholden to party, broader cultural attitudes, party preferences, likelihood of backlash of reversal, the 
desire to minimize distractions from other priorities.
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of litigation ensures that the content of individual rights will vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction—with more variation in controversial cases.
Injunctive relief must be closely tailored to the particularized injuries of 
complainants after byzantine rules of standing are met (no such 
jurisdictional or remedial rules govern changes in executive policy or 
practice), and despite a recent willingness on the part of judges to grant 
such relief, nationwide injunctions remain a controversial remedy, given 
concerns about undue interference with national policies and the ease of 
forum shopping.161
Violations of injunctions, too, are subject to rules requiring gradually 
escalating pressure on recalcitrant government actors. By contrast, changes 
in an administration’s executive orders, agency interpretations of the law 
and Constitution, policies, guidelines, and enforcement practices have 
broader reach than most judicial orders and are easier to accomplish. A
president also possesses more tools at his disposal to streamline a theory of 
rights, especially within his spheres of influence.
One important clarification: My point here is not to suggest that a 
president’s articulation of individual rights is always superior to judicial 
interpretations or somehow immune to politics. To the contrary, my 
argument concedes that politics infuse the making of rights from beginning 
to end, and claims that presidential politics are sufficiently complex that 
one should expect to find surprising areas of stability across time. 
Even when a candidate from a different party wins the presidency 
based on promises to undo his predecessor’s achievements, a successor 
might find a more confined environment upon taking office. Efforts to 
repeal, narrow, or undermine an inherited policy on rights may prove to be 
more costly than originally anticipated or distracting to other priorities. 
Loyalists of a prior regime may resist changes on ideological grounds. 
Thus, outright repudiation of a legal right by a successor may be untenable, 
and legal transformation, if it is to be undertaken by high officials, must be 
done surreptitiously.
The Trump administration’s efforts to repeal Obamacare in 2017, 
capped by the Senate’s failure to gain a majority vote to do so, offered a
stunning example of these lessons in action. For years, a number of 
politicians had called for healthcare as a national right. After litigation 
intended to upend the law mostly failed, President Obama declared victory 
by saying, “In the United States, health care is not a privilege for the 
                                                                                                                         
161 For skeptical accounts of nationwide injunctions, see Getzel Berger, Nationwide Injunctions 
Against the Federal Government: A Structural Approach, 92 N.Y.U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2931267; Samuel Bray, 
Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 130 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2864175.
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fortunate few, it is a right.”162 Republicans regularly assailed the 
Affordable Care Act on the campaign trail, but given the opportunity and 
power to erase it legislatively, came face to face with the reality of 
healthcare as a right: mobilized constituents angry over the loss of 
coverage and rising costs, healthcare insurers concerned about the 
economic uncertainties entailed in repeal, and medical providers worried 
that the quality of care might worsen.
Efforts to erode healthcare as an individual right continue, but until
conservatives and libertarians can find a solution they can rally around, 
erosion will have to be done through executive action alone. For instance, 
President Trump suggested he might just let the system “collapse” from 
neglect, perhaps by refusing to pay insurers on time, by not enforcing the 
tax penalty for being uninsured, or even by spending less money on things 
that affect how many people learn about available plans and sign up for 
one of them.
The Trump administration’s initial approach to the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) is another useful example. As a candidate, 
Trump had vowed to immediately undo President Obama’s executive order 
granting a stay of removal to this class of undocumented immigrants who 
came as children.163 Because DACA created 800,000 beneficiaries, or 
“Dreamers,” and those individuals enjoyed significant support among 
Americans,164 Trump initially did not end DACA but instead made 
Dreamers a priority for removal only if they committed a crime or engaged 
in fraud.165 For nine months, any effort to undermine the status of 
Dreamers could only be done covertly.
                                                                                                                         
162 Scott Wilson & Ovetta Wiggins, Obama Defends Health-Care Law, Calling Health Insurance 
‘A Right,’ WASH. POST. (Sept. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-defends-
health-care-law-calling-health-insurance-a-right/2013/09/26/9e1d946e-26b8-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852
_story.html?utm_term=.c32322178906.
163 See Serena Marshall, What Could Happen to DACA Recipients Under Donald Trump, ABC
NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016, 2:28 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/happen-daca-recipients-donald-
trump/story?id=43546706 (discussing Donald Trump’s campaign promises to end Obama’s executive 
orders).
164 Fifty-eight percent of those polled think Dreamers should be allowed to stay and given a shot 
at earning citizenship, while another eighteen percent support allowing them to stay but oppose 
citizenship. Only fifteen percent believe they should be deported. Steven Shepard, Poll: Majority 
Opposes Deporting Dreamers, POLITICO (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/05/poll-trump-deporting-daca-dreamers-242343.
165 Dreamers were made subject to the new rules that expand the list of grounds for removal, 
including conviction “of any criminal offense,” commission of any act that could be “a chargeable 
criminal offense,” “fraud in connection with any government matter,” or abuse of “any program related 
to receipt of public benefits.” See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Homeland Sec.,
Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest 2 (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-
Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf (urging Homeland Security personnel to 
“prioritize” the removal of certain illegal aliens). 
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After much internal debate, the White House announced it would be 
phasing out the program over a six-month period to give Congress a 
chance to fashion a legislative solution.166 Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
argued that President Obama’s prior executive order was unconstitutional 
and indefensible in court, and denied that an indispensable social good was 
created by the program.167
Because President Trump’s decision suddenly altered the expectations 
of Dreamers, he tried to shift the responsibility of maintaining the status 
quo to Congress. This was always the part of his immigration policy most 
likely to earn a legislative reversal, with some members of his own party 
joining Democrats rebuking the President, advocacy groups promising to 
tie up the change in litigation, and legislators promising bipartisan efforts 
to pass a Dream Act. In fact, just days after Sessions announced the shift in 
policy, President Trump undercut his own Attorney General’s position, 
saying that he agreed with Democratic leaders that something needed to be 
done to protect Dreamers.168
Thus, DACA poignantly illustrates precepts 2 and 5, that rights can 
develop powerful constituencies and not all presidential actions are equal, 
for Obama’s decision to take a controversial act based solely on the theory 
of prosecutorial discretion rendered it more vulnerable to repudiation. At 
the same time, DACA tests maxim 6, which posits that rights 
developments are usually asymmetrical, as proponents of DACA now try 
their best to ground Dreamers’ rights and benefits through more durable 
processes of bicameralism and presentment.
To say that presidential views on certain rights can remain stable 
across administrations does not mean that a president will always adopt the 
more expansive rights interpretation every time. That would be an overly 
deterministic account of how executive-created rights work. It simply 
means that the social conditions favor respect for a right such that 
deviations from that position would have to be justified and that the costs 
of deviating from such a principle will have increased in important ways 
                                                                                                                         
166 Eliana Johnson, Trump Has Decided to End DACA, with 6-Month Delay, POLITICO (Sept. 4, 
2017, 12:40 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/03/trump-dreamers-immigration-daca-
immigrants -242301.
167 Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., to Elaine Duke, Acting Sec’y Homeland Sec. 
(Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0904_DOJ_AG-letter-
DACA.pdf.
168 Maggie Haberman & Yamiche Alcindor, Pelosi and Schumer Say They Have Deal With 
Trump to Replace DACA, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/us/
politics/trump-dinner-schumer-pelosi-daca-obamacare.html. On September 14, 2017, President Trump 
tweeted: “Does anybody really want to throw out good, educated and accomplished young people who 
have jobs, some serving in the military? Really! . . . . They have been in our country for many years 
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(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 14, 2017, 3:35 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump
/status/908278070611779585.
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from the previous status quo in which no expectation of rights existed.
Occasional exceptions from a binding norm are never the same as a denial 
of the baseline existence of an authoritative principle.
The social realities involved in the making of rights are confirmed by 
the manner in which wily advocates talk about particular controversies. 
Astute participants in a constitutional debate speak with one eye on an 
imaginary clock. Proponents of rights try to act as expeditiously as possible 
to make reliance on rights part of their constituents’ social existence and to 
maximize the advantages of path dependency. Opponents, too, see 
themselves as working furiously to prevent a critical mass of citizens from 
giving up on their narrower vision of rights. For instance, Obamacare’s 
detractors sought to delay implementation of the plan and stoke support for 
its repeal at every turn. They worried, justifiably, that once the rollout 
occurred the right to healthcare would become ingrained as part of what 
they called “a culture of dependence.”169
Despite the pejorative quality of these statements (intended to foster a 
lingering sense of shame and illegitimacy), they nevertheless confirmed a 
sense that once rights are granted and a constituency develops around such 
a right, a contrary interpretation of law will be far more difficult to 
dislodge. The same can be said of the social foundations of same-sex 
marriage rights; the more that civilly recognized bonds of this nature 
became a part of everyday life, the harder it would be to reverse this 
dynamic without incurring major social, institutional, and political costs.
The gay marriage issue bears many of the indicators of a 
transformation of an individual right that may prove to be lasting rather 
than fleeting. For one thing, the pressure to resist development of this right 
has seemingly reached its high point and begun to slide, whereas support 
for the right has been swift, surprisingly broad-based, and sustainable in an 
intergenerational way. Second, the weight of judicial decisions is markedly 
one-sided, with rulings striking down state DOMA’s in liberal and 
conservative jurisdictions across the country—culminating in Obergefell.
The emergence of a juridic resolution hinted at a broader popular 
consensus, but more importantly, suggested a unifying way of thinking of 
the constitutional stakes—one that became increasingly attractive to legal 
                                                                                                                         
169 See AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, at lix (William F. 
Buckley, Jr., ed., 2011) (describing welfare state generally as creating a “culture of dependence”); 
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actors.170 Third, in both appearance and fact, judges could be said to have 
followed a durable shift in public attitudes rather than trying to lead them.
None of this means that disagreement will disappear, for religious 
dissent remains critical to a pluralist legal order. Efforts to strike the right 
balance between equality and pluralism will continue. What it does mean is 
that now that a right to same-sex marriage has been backed by a sitting 
president and inscribed by the Court into its precedents, the costs of 
resistance to the new constitutional norm go up considerably for 
successors.171
B. Does Presidential Leadership Imply Judicial Subordination?
Recognizing that the modern presidency possesses great power to 
transform individual rights does not relegate courts to an inferior position.  
Instead, it simply recognizes several realities. First, each coordinate branch 
has an independent duty to read and apply the Constitution. Presidential 
leadership is merely the primary mechanism used by ideologically 
committed executive branch officials to make changes to dominant 
constitutional understandings. In that sense, the Constitution is superior to 
both the presidency and the judiciary. Second, in the ideal world, we 
should want presidential actors to care deeply about their constitutional 
responsibilities, to become expert at carrying them out, and to strive to 
persuade others of the correctness of their interpretation when they believe 
others have fallen short. Third, executive-based development of rights 
assumes even greater importance when one understands that courts can 
handle only so many cases as a practical matter and have restricted court 
access through a host of technical legal doctrines.  That means that for 
many kinds of executive actions, policies, and practices, regular judicial 
oversight is simply not realistic.   
It is possible, of course, for a populist president to conceive of rights in 
ways that depart from established judicial understandings. For example, 
during his campaign, President Trump endorsed policies that diverged 
                                                                                                                         
170 Elections that lead to a change in party control of the executive branch qualify as such a 
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from judicial rulings on free speech, religious freedom, search and seizure, 
and cruel and usual punishment. My model recognizes a president’s 
prerogative to make claims that judicial conceptions fail to strike the right 
balance given the people’s sentiments or priorities.  Every president has the 
power to test the social foundations of constitutional law. But he will have 
to be ready to battle to actually alter settled expectations about rights.
Where a conception of rights is not well codified, either in judicial 
rulings or statutes, a change in position on the part of a president does not 
threaten the judicial function. It might result in unwise policy, but that 
alone would not upset the constitutional balance. Granting more 
protections to individuals within a president’s sphere of authority than the 
courts have done (say, as the military’s new policies regarding sexuality 
do) generally raises no problem, unless there is a direct conflict with 
another constitutional power or individual liberty.
But what if a president decides that individual rights have gone too far, 
and insists that judicial interpretations should be restricted further or 
explicitly overruled? This might characterize President Trump’s Muslim 
travel ban, which has tested well-established ideas of equality and religious 
freedom, as much as it describes FDR’s more limited theory of the right of 
contract in the 1930s.172 Here, too, a president’s chances of success will 
turn on whether he resists judicial interpretations in ways that still respect 
the courts’ prerogative to say what the law is. Outright defiance of a 
binding judicial order will rarely be countenanced. Yet, short of waging 
open war against the judiciary, a president can often reshape rights in his
own domain, and then cajole others—agencies, legislators, and even 
judges—to go along. 
C. Presidential Leadership Rather than Partisan Entrenchment or the 
“Ground Up” Approach
Political parties play an important role in the development of rights and 
the prospect that a president might seize a leadership role over such 
matters. Parties shape agendas by determining policies that can impact 
established rights, and by describing certain kinds of issues in rights-based 
rhetoric. They generate support for some rights over others, and try to force 
                                                                                                                         
172 Upon taking office, President Trump signed an Executive Order restricting travel and refugees 
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candidates who wish to bear a party’s standard to pre-commit to these 
rights.  Once elected, party leaders can try to keep the momentum going on 
certain rights through lobbying the president, and if a president commits 
openly to a rights-based course of action (e.g., healthcare, ending the ban 
on gays in the military), the party may lend a hand by reinforcing an 
administration’s messages.
At the same time, partisan processes describe some, but not all, of the 
dynamics at work when the executive branch seeks to lead the 
development of rights. Some comparative points can be drawn in reference 
to Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson’s work, which outlines a model of 
constitutional lawmaking that they call “partisan entrenchment.”173
According to this model, constitutional doctrines change in large part as 
presidents try to inscribe their party’s policy preferences on the law. For 
Balkin and Levinson, the key to the model is that partisans anticipating an 
eventual loss of access to formal power take steps to entrench their 
constitutional visions by appointing judges who seem to share their 
values.174 Although these authors at times seem to limit the scope of their 
theory to the appointments power and exclude presidential constructions of 
the Constitution, at other times they suggest that a full version of the theory 
would include advisory actions and litigation conducted by executive 
branch lawyers.175
What Balkin and Levinson get right is that judicial endorsement of 
another actor’s constitutional theory is the gold standard as a matter of 
party strategy; judicial interpretations carry a normative claim, backed by 
the practice of judicial review, across multiple social domains. But the 
theory of partisan entrenchment is incomplete in several ways. 
First, it blurs partisan processes with other institutional dynamics that 
are not overtly partisan in nature. These non-partisan processes that can
influence executive-based development of rights include agencies, the civil 
service, the foreign policy establishment, advocacy groups, and the legal 
profession. As the Trump administration’s troubles in advancing its agenda 
have revealed, these actors, organizations, and their non-governmental 
allies have independent characters of their own; they can find themselves 
acting in concert with a party in power on a question of rights, but can also 
find themselves at odds with a presidential agenda to preserve a
predecessor’s theories of rights and powers. To subsume all of these 
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175 See id. at 497–500 (discussing prominent theories of constitutional change). 
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dynamics within a president’s desire to advance his party’s interests is to 
deny these individuals and associations agency.
Second, the fact that the appointments power remains central to the 
story of partisan entrenchment keeps courts at the center of constitutional 
theory. By doing so, it misses that a president can often make 
constitutional law in his own domain without resorting to the courts, even 
if doing so goes beyond, or at times appears to undermine, judicial 
interpretations of rights.  A president’s vision of constitutional liberty and 
equality can be spread among executive branch institutions, administrative 
regulations, advisory opinions, and agency policies, quite apart from what 
courts say (which I should add, tends to be cautious and undertheorized 
most of the time, anyway).  
Third, partisan considerations are crucial, but not always 
determinative, features of presidential decision making. Not all individual 
rights are prominently featured in a party’s platform and when they are, a 
president is free to set his own priorities and timetable for progress on such 
matters. Moreover, partisan dynamics cannot fully account for the 
dynamics of transformative leadership. A president inhabits a different 
mindset from that of a party leader when he seeks to articulate a theory of 
individual rights, one in which he believes he must represent all of the 
people of the United States. 
My criticism of partisan entrenchment does not mean that political 
parties are irrelevant. It means only that actions have to be justified on 
more than partisan terms and that it is important for a president to avoid 
charges of overly partisan behaviors when seeking to transform 
constitutional rights. Any president worth his salt is driven by a desire to 
create a historical legacy, and this psycho-political dimension of legal 
development is broader and more complicated than satisfying one political 
party’s demands. A president’s reputation—if he is to be remembered as a 
great leader—entails successfully confronting national problems that arise, 
rather than simply pushing a list of policy objectives drawn up by political 
patrons. In this sense, partisan entrenchment misstates the frame of mind 
necessary to alter constitutional commitments in a durable fashion.
If the two-party system alone cannot drive or authorize constitutional 
change, neither can a particular social movement do all the work that is 
necessary for lasting shifts. “Bottom-up” accounts of law have helped 
recover lost details about the lives of less celebrated social activists and the 
forgotten connections between legal ideas.176 But social movement theory 
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ultimately runs out of explanatory power when it comes to constitutional 
change. For one thing, because a movement lacks formal authority under 
the Constitution and laws, no social movement can ever exercise the power 
to initiate or authorize constitutional change. For another thing, concerns 
will always be raised that a movement does not represent widespread 
sentiment. Instead, every movement is vulnerable to charges that it 
represents parochial or partial interests.
Many movements associate themselves with particular parties to gain 
proximity to power (say, the Labor movement and the gay rights 
movement with the Democrats, or the Tea Party movement and the pro-life 
movement with the Republicans). But any movement that links its agenda 
to party politics risks capture by party operatives and the dilution of 
movement goals.  
At its finest, a social movement can invoke the rhetoric and tradition of 
popular sovereignty to prick the conscience of fellow Americans and try to 
shape the terms of debate. Its members can turn to the courts, seek to 
infiltrate governmental agencies, and agitate outside of formal processes
when the odds look long. But most of the time, they must hope for a 
rupture in historical time or the emergence of a national coalition.
In fact, the best plan for constitutional success is to secure the support 
of formal decision makers. Courts have been a favorite institution for
activists, but for reasons already discussed, judges remain unreliable allies.
Constitutional change through judicial appointments takes years, 
sometimes decades, to reach the point that a major doctrinal shift is 
pronounced and likely to take place. Legislators, too, are a fractured bunch 
and the costs of securing enough legislative support can be too high a price 
for marginalized groups to pay. 
Faced with these choices, presidential leadership over rights can 
present the most dynamic and promising option. Presidents and their allies, 
more than any other national actor, can efficaciously respond to a 
movement’s grievances and lend legitimacy to its cause. It is easier to 
infiltrate government agencies and bypass formal processes to gain the ear 
of a well-connected White House aide. Executive branch officials have a 
wide range of tools by which to advance the cause of rights outside of the 
courts—not only in making tangible legal changes but also in trying to 
shape public discourse. 
A president’s lawyers enjoy clout precisely because they are not 
perceived as movement figures. Even so, in the courts, high officials can 
adopt movement language and ideas, urging judges to see the stakes as 
they do and to speak about them in similar terms. More than ever, it makes 
sense to pay close attention to this model of legal transformation, 
especially in a world where the Supreme Court takes fewer and fewer cases 
and Congress remains gridlocked for much of the time.
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Presidential intervention occurred at a key moment for the marriage 
equality movement. After major setbacks, activists began to secure
achievements at the state level. These successes came in beating back anti-
gay marriage laws at the ballot box and advancing the cause of marriage 
equality in the courts—especially in Massachusetts. Wins in state court 
helped build momentum for victories in federal court, and those federal 
judicial decisions could then be taken to other state courts.177
But even then, the federal DOMA loomed. That federal law, signed by 
a Democratic President and supported by many legislators at the time, 
remained a major obstacle to recognition of gay marriage as a social good 
that implicated the rights of national citizenship. DOMA not only barred 
federal agencies from treating gay marriages the same as opposite-sex
marriages, but it also signaled to important constituencies and state actors 
that the people as a whole embraced traditional marriage.
President Obama’s change of mind on the issue came at a crucial time: 
late enough that he could not be considered a crusader, but early enough to 
have an impact on the ultimate outcome. His aides’ creation of a different 
constitutional theory of rights, and their efforts to implement a new 
conception of equality across multiple agencies, helped alter the social 
environment in which landmark judicial decisions were made. In both 
word and deed, the administration characterized gay marriage as a social 
good governed by constitutional law, as consistent with popular sentiment
and the lived experience of ordinary Americans, and as a right that the 
executive branch would help to enforce. And in the end, those efforts 
helped put that individual right on a path to wider acceptance.
CONCLUSION
This article has employed the Obama administration’s turnabout on 
gay marriage as a case study on how a president can create constitutional 
rights in his own spheres of influence, popularize alternative theories of the 
Constitution, and prod the courts to reconsider their interpretation of rights.  
This model of constitutional law making is premised on the phenomenon 
of presidential leadership, which allows such a figure to seek 
transformative changes in the nation’s laws and policies by appealing to 
popular sentiment.  
An American president who invokes this tradition to remake 
constitutional rights faces many social constraints. Most of the time, he 
will have to exploit legal opportunities created by others. When the model
                                                                                                                         
177 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (“Limiting the 
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the basic 
premises of individual liberty and equality under the law protected by the Massachusetts 
Constitution.”). Justice Kennedy cited Goodridge in both Windsor and Obergefell. United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597, 2600 (2015).
60 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1
succeeds—and the recognition of same-sex marriage as a constitutional 
right can be counted as a success story for this model of leadership—social 
conflict must turn into institutional coordination long enough for new 
values to be codified. On this occasion, the right to same-sex marriage 
became mutually reinforced through judicial rulings, executive branch 
policies, and interpretations of federal law. 
